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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 960154-CA 
v. : 
JEFFERY GENE SPRAGUE, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of thirteen 
counts of burglary, all third degree felonies, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995) (attached in addendum A); one 
count of theft by receiving stolen property, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995); 
and one count of possession of an instrument for burglary or 
theft, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-
6-205 (1995). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED PN APPEAL 
ANP STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Where defendant was charged with burglarizing thirteen 
individual storage units of a storage facility on a single night, 
was there sufficient evidence that he entered six of the units to 
support his convictions on those six charges? 
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence below, an 
appellate court must view the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
verdict. State v. Souza. 846 P.2d 1313, 1322 (Utah App. 1993); 
State v. Viail, 840 P.2d 788, 792-93 (Utah App. 1992), cert, 
denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). Reversal is warranted only 
when the evidence is sufficiently "inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which 
he . . . was convicted." Souza. 846 P.2d at 1322 (quotation 
omitted); Vigil. 840 P.2d at 792-93. When dealing with 
circumstantial evidence, this Court must determine whether there 
is "sufficient competent evidence" to enable the jury to find, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant committed the crime. 
£££ State v. Blubauah. 904 P.2d 688, 695 (Utah App. 1995), cert, 
denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996). 
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2. Did the trial court properly admit limited reference to 
the March 29, 1995, burglary of numerous storage units in a 
storage facility when defendant was charged with the March 30 
burglary of numerous units in the same facility? 
Defendant erroneously claims that the trial court's 
admission of the evidence was based on Utah Rule of Evidence 
404(b)• However, the trial court found rule 404(b) inapplicable 
and instead admitted the evidence pursuant to rule 403. On 
appeal, the trial court's decision to admit evidence under rule 
403 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, i.e., whether the 
ruling went "beyond the limits of reasonability." Blubaugh, 904 
P.2d at 699 (quotation omitted). Where the lower court is found 
to have erred, the appellate court will reverse only if the error 
was harmful--if, absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in or appended to this brief. Those 
provisions include: Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995), and Utah 
Rules of Evidence 403 and 404. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Jeffery Gene Sprague and co-defendant Jack 
Christopher Jennings were charged with thirteen counts of 
burglary, all third degree felonies; one count of possession of 
an instrument for burglary or theft, and one count of theft by 
receiving, both class B misdemeanors (R. 8-13)• The charges 
arose from the early morning burglaries of individual storage 
units within a storage facility located in West Valley City on 
March 30, 1995 (R. 8-13, 399-400). Defendants were tried 
together on all charges, having made no motions to sever any of 
the burglary charges (R. 385)-1 
Following a two-day trial, the jury convicted defendant as 
charged (R. 70-71, 75-76, 124-38, 217). The court obtained a 
presentence investigation report, then sentenced defendant to 
thirteen concurrent terms of zero-to-five years in the Utah State 
Prison on the burglary counts, and concurrent terms of 6 months 
on both misdemeanors (R. 217, 240-54, 799-800). 
*In a motion in limine filed immediately prior to trial, 
defendant sought exclusion of certain evidence and, in the 
alternative, severance of the charge dealing with possession of 
stolen property (R. 376-79) (attached as addendum B). He 
thereafter withdrew his severance request, and the trial court 
excluded the evidence (R. 383-87). Addendum B. Defendant made 
no other severance requests. 
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On appeal, defendant challenges six of the thirteen burglary 
convictions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At 2:00 a.m. on March 30, 1995, for the second night in a 
row, Officers Danny Benzon and Scott Ricks were driving on 
routine patrol past Central Self-Storage on the west side of 
Redwood Road in West Valley City when they noticed the gates 
across the facility's driveway were standing open (R. 478, 504-
06, 528, 531, 548-49). The night before, they had found that the 
lock on the front gate and locks on several units in the facility 
had been cut with bolt cutters, the doors to the units had been 
opened, and several things had been taken (R. 502-04, 549-50). 
The incident had been investigated, most of the owners had been 
notified, all the locks--including the lock on the front gate-
had been replaced, and every unit had been checked and secured 
before the facility closed its doors the evening of March 29 (R. 
482-83, 486-91, 594-95). 
The officers stopped for a closer look and found, as they 
had the night before, that the gate lock had again been cut and 
was lying on the ground by the gates (R. 504-05, 550) . Officer 
Benzon stayed near the front gate while Officer Ricks drove 
around the facility in his police canine truck to determine 
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whether anyone was still on the property (R. 505-06, 520, 540, 
542-43, 551, 553). Once again, the locks to several units had 
been cut and the doors opened (R. 505, 551-52, 571-74) . Locks 
and pieces of locks were scattered on the ground (R. 565, 573). 
Finding no one, Ricks returned to the front gate and parked the 
marked truck where it was not visible by northbound traffic on 
Redwood Road (R. 506-08, 553-54). The officers roused the 
manager and his wife, who lived on-site near the front gate, then 
waited outside for the couple to dress (R. 506, 552-53). 
While they waited, both officers noticed a Jeep Wagoneer 
approach northbound on Redwood Road (R. 508, 532, 553). The Jeep 
turned toward them across the two-lane road, crossing the center-
line and proceeding through the southbound lane (R. 508, 553-54) . 
Just before the Jeep reached the driveway of the storage 
facility, the officers saw it suddenly turn north and accelerate, 
driving in the southbound lane and, at times, partially on the 
gravel shoulder of the southbound lane as it drove away (R. 509-
10, 554-55). The officers immediately pursued the Jeep, turning 
on their overhead lights once they were northbound on Redwood 
Road (R. 509, 555, 566). 
The Jeep, still northbound in the southbound lane, drove 
past the field immediately north of the storage facility and 
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turned left into the parking lot of a strip mall just beyond the 
field (R. 510, 555). It pulled to a stop, and the officers 
stopped behind it (id.). Ricks approached the driver's side of 
the Jeep where he found defendant at the wheel (R. 511, 556). 
Before Ricks could say a word, defendant stated, "Why were you 
stopping me? I haven't done anything. I haven't stolen 
anything. I'm just here to use the ATM bank machine because 
there isn't one in Midvale." (R. 556-57, 566, 665-66). Ricks 
took defendant's identification and returned to his vehicle (R. 
557-58). 
Meanwhile, Benzon had approached the passenger side to 
observe the passenger, Jack Jennings, and to insure that there 
was nothing in the Jeep which might present a danger to the 
officers (R. 510, 512, 535). Working from the back of the Jeep 
to the front, Benzon shone his flashlight into the Jeep from 
outside (R. 512). Seeing nothing as he worked toward the front, 
he looked at the floorboards as he worked his way back again (R. 
512-13). On the floor behind the passenger's seat he saw a 
computer keyboard sitting amid the trash and the clutter (R. 512-
13) . 
About that time, Officer Charles Kirby arrived and joined 
Benzon on the passenger side of the Jeep (R. 513, 557-58). He 
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conducted the same sweep Benzon had done, and discovered on the 
floor next to the keyboard a lock on which the hasp had been cut 
(R. 513, 558, 614, 616). The officers alerted Ricks, who ordered 
both men removed from the Jeep (R. 513, 558, 616). As defendant 
stepped out, he told Ricks, "You're more than welcome to search 
the vehicle" and "You won't find anything" (R. 516, 557, 616). 
After removing the passenger from the car and checking for 
warrants, Benzon walked to where Ricks had defendant (R. 514). 
He noticed that both suspects were nervous and scared and that 
their statements weren't quite the same (id.). Consequently, both 
men were arrested (R. 514, 559). Benzon conducted an inventory 
search of the vehicle, and discovered a pair of bolt cutters on 
the floor on the front passenger side of the Jeep and two 
-flashlights on the front seat (R. 516-17, 543-45, 558-59). He 
also discovered a number of other locks and hasp pieces in the 
Jeep, including an overlook--a lock attached by the manager of 
the burglarized storage facility to the door of units belonging 
to people who were behind on their rent (R. 490-91, 518-22, 599). 
The lock sported a red label stating, "Please see manager. 
Unauthorized removal of this lock constitutes breaking and 
entering" (R. 601). Such a lock had earlier been placed by the 
manager, Wesley Taylor, on one of the units burglarized on March 
8 
30, but was not found at the storage facility after the burglary 
(R. 490-91, 599-600, 602). At trial, Taylor identified the 
overlock from defendant's Jeep as one of his locks and produced a 
key that opened it (R. 600-01). 
As part of its case-in-chief, the State called on an expert 
in tool mark identification who explained how he was able to 
positively match the bolt cutters found in the Jeep to the marks 
on two of the locks cut at the storage facility on March 30, one 
of which was found lying on the ground at the scene and one of 
which was found in defendant's car (R. 644-49, 649-53, 662). He 
did not match the bolt cutters to every lock found, but explained 
that the more a single set of bolt cutters is used, the more the 
face of the cutters is changed, so that a match may only be found 
in items most recently cut with the cutters (R. 6588-59, 663) . 
The jury rejected defendant's alibi evidence and found him 
guilty as charged on all fifteen counts (R. 124-38). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I: Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient 
to support six of the burglary convictions because the State was 
permitted to use evidence relating to seven of the thirteen 
burglary charges to establish the element of entry as to the 
remaining six units, in violation of Utah Rule of Evidence 
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404(b). However, that rule is not concerned with the use of 
evidence already properly before the trier of fact. Further, the 
prosecutor never suggested that the evidence be used by the jury 
in that manner. Accordingly, the rule does not apply to 
defendant's claim that the State should not have been permitted 
to use evidence pertaining to some of the charges against him as 
circumstantial evidence as to the remaining charges. 
The issue properly is one of relevance and prejudice under 
rule 403. The State's ability to use circumstantial evidence to 
meet its burden of proof as to any element of a charged offense 
is well-recognized. The fact that the circumstantial evidence 
relates to more than one charged offense being tried at the same 
time should not affect the State's ability to use the evidence. 
Moreover, there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's 
convictions regardless of whether the jury could consider the 
evidence establishing defendant's entry into seven units to be 
circumstantial evidence of his entry into the remaining six 
units. 
Point II: The trial court's admission of limited testimony 
concerning the burglary of several units at the same storage 
facility the night before the burglaries for which defendant was 
charged and convicted was not based on rule 404(b). Further, the 
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rule is inapplicable where nothing was adduced at trial to 
establish defendant's involvement in the earlier burglaries. 
Instead, the testimony was properly admitted pursuant to rule 403 
because it was relevant to the jury's determination of witness 
credibility. The probative value of the evidence was not 
substantially outweighed by any possibility of unfair prejudice 
where defendant was not tied to the events of the night before, 
there was no remarkable fact common to the events of both nights, 
the prosecutor did not mention the events of the night before in 
his closing remarks, and defendant not only told the jury twice 
that the previous burglaries were not at issue, but also took the 
opportunity to distance himself from the previous night's events 
by adducing evidence that he did not obtain possession of the 
bolt cutters until after the first burglaries had occurred. 
ARgUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE STATE'S USE OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH 
THE ENTRY ELEMENT FOR SIX OF THE THIRTEEN CHARGED 
BURGLARIES IS NOT PROHIBITED BY UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 
404(b); THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BELOW, INCLUDING THE 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND THE REASONABLE INFERENCES 
THEREFROM, WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S 
BURGLARY CONVICTIONS 
At trial, the owners of seven of the thirteen units involved 
in the March 30 burglary testified that items in their units were 
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either moved or missing after the burglary (R. 414, 415, 419, 
420, 422, 427-28, 436, 438, 444, 447, 454, 457, 497, 499). Of 
the remaining owners, two could not be located before trial and, 
hence, did not testify (R. 479-50), and four testified that they 
had not been able to determine that anything had been moved or 
taken, despite the fact that the locks on their units had been 
cut off and the doors opened (R. 431-33, 440, 443, 450-51, 641-
42). In his closing argument, defendant argued that "as to the 
people that testified that nothing was moved in their storage 
unit, there's no proof of an entry on those counts" (R. 766). He 
then identified each unit and argued that the State had not 
presented any evidence of entry as to those units (R. 766-67). 
The prosecutor, on the other hand, presented no argument as to 
the evidence he felt established entry into the challenged units, 
and responded to defendant's closing argument on the point by 
stating, "I suggest the only doubts that are in this case are 
fanciful and imaginary, and that the evidence supports all of the 
elements of these various crimes," (R. 779). 
Defendant's argument is two-fold. First, he claims that 
when thirteen burglaries committed at the same time and place are 
charged and tried together, the State is not legally permitted to 
rely on evidence which establishes entry into seven of the units 
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as circumstantial evidence of entry into the remaining six units. 
Appellant's Br. at 11-15. Second, he claims that without that 
type of circumstantial evidence, the remaining evidence was 
wholly insufficient to support his conviction on six of the 
thirteen burglary counts. Id. at 15-16. The trial court 
rejected both arguments (R. 674-75, 792) (attached as addendum 
C). 
&*. Rule 404(b) governs The Admissibility Of Other Acts 
Evidence! Not Its Use Once It Has Been Properly Admitted? 
Hence Rule 404(b) Does Not Apply To Defendant's Claim Of 
£££££ 
Defendant argues broadly that this Court should not permit 
the State to escape its burden of establishing every element of 
every charge "by relying largely on evidence of other crimes" to 
establish one element. Appellant's Br. at 13. In support, he 
claims that the State cannot argue that if the jury finds 
defendant guilty of seven of the burglary charges it may assume 
his guilt of the remaining six, then relies on rule 404(b) to 
support his claim. Id. However, rule 404(b) has no application 
to this issue. 
Rule 404(b) provides: 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
13 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
(Rule 404 is reproduced in its entirety in addendum A.) Although 
the defendant relies on rule 404(b) and cites to the Utah Supreme 
Court's latest explanation of the rule. State v. Doporto, 308 
Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1997), this is not a rule 404(b) issue 
for several reasons. 
First, defendant does not challenge the admissibility of the 
evidence establishing entry into seven of the charged units--only 
its use. Defendant seeks to limit the jury's use of evidence 
which is already properly before it. However, once evidence has 
been properly admitted, defendant must resort to avenues other 
than rule 404(b) to limit its use because the plain language of 
the rule applies only to the admissibility of the evidence, not 
its use once it is otherwise properly admitted. Defendant did 
not challenge the admission of the evidence that seven of the 
units were entered, and he failed to take any proper measure to 
limit the use of the evidence once it was properly admitted: he 
did not request a cautionary or limiting instruction to the jury, 
seek severance of the six challenged charges, or otherwise 
14 
attempt to restrict use of the evidence.2 He cites no authority 
for expanding the scope of rule 404(b) beyond the admissibility 
of evidence, and the State has found none. 
Second, the evidence of entry into the seven units was not 
admitted for the prohibited purpose of establishing defendant's 
propensity to commit criminal acts--it was properly admitted as 
part of the State's case-in-chief as evidence directly relating 
to seven of the thirteen burglaries for which defendant was on 
trial. The State did not use it for the prohibited purpose of 
establishing defendant's propensity to commit this particular 
type of burglary; in other words, the State never claimed that if 
the jury found defendant had committed any of the burglaries, it 
could assume he had committed the remaining burglaries. See 
Doporto. 308 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22. In fact, the State never 
argued to the jury that evidence that seven units were entered 
2When he brought up the issue prior to trial, defendant 
merely requested that the court 
make a ruling . . . that we not talk in terms of 13 
burglaries, that we somehow limit them. Because I 
think it's prejudicial to our clients to talk about 'X' 
number of burglaries there if there's not going to be 
any evidence forthcoming sufficient to establish that 
those units--each individual unit was burglarized." 
(R. 372). 
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might generate an inference that the remaining six units were 
entered. Accordingly, rule 404(b) has no application to this 
issue. 
Additionally, the fact that neither this issue nor the 
relevant facts upon which it turns were present in any of the 
cases cited by defendant renders his argument unpersuasive. For 
example, in United States v. Krezdorn. 639 F.2d 1327, 1330 (5th 
Cir. 1981), defendant was convicted of four counts of forgery 
after a trial in which the State introduced evidence of thirty-
two uncharged acts of forgery together with expert testimony 
which tied defendant to the charged and uncharged acts. The 
forgeries were committed on two or more "separate occasions." 
Id. at 1329. The court held that the uncharged acts of forgery 
were erroneously admitted in violation of rule 404(b). Id. at 
1332. in United States v. Eichman/ 756 F.Supp. 143, 145 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), defendant was charged with and tried for a 
single count of burglary, and the State freely admitted it did 
not contend, let alone prove, that defendant entered within the 
four walls of the subject building. Instead, the State attempted 
to establish the requisite element of entry by proving that 
defendant entered into *an area of or related to a building to 
which the public has been or can be denied access"--i.e., the 
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roof of the building. Id. at 145, 147. The court rejected the 
State's attempt to expand the entry element of burglary. Id. at 
148-49.3 
3See also State v. Doporto. 308 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah Jan. 
17, 1997) (testimony from victims of defendant's sexual 
misconduct years prior to the single charged act of sodomy on a 
child was erroneously admitted in violation of rule 404(b) where 
the evidence related to an admitted fact, there was no remarkable 
fact shared by the prior conduct and the charged crime, neither 
offense showed a unique or unusual modus operandi, and the acts 
were merely similar and shared features common to many such 
cases); State V, FeatherSPIl/ 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989) (finding 
error in admission of evidence of prior convictions of rape and 
aggravated assault as there was no relationship between those 
convictions and the current charges of aggravated sexual assault 
and aggravated burglary; similarity in defense presented in all 
the offenses does not relate to modus operandi); State v. Tarafa. 
720 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1986) (finding prosecutorial misconduct in 
the prosecutor's argument to the jury that defendant's prior 
burglary conviction demonstrates his propensity to commit the 
charged theft); State V, Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985) 
(reversing the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to 
sever where evidence that defendant was a prison inmate when he 
committed the offense giving rise to charges of burglary, theft, 
possession of a firearm by a restricted person, and being a 
habitual criminal was relevant to only two of the charges and 
would be inadmissible under rule 404(b) in a separate trial on 
the other charges); State v. Forsyth. 641 P.2d 1172 (Utah 1982) 
(approving the use of testimony from defendant's prior investors 
concerning representations made by defendant accused of theft by 
deception as relevant to prove some fact material to the crime 
charged--common plan or scheme); Longstreth v. State, 832 P.2d 
560, 564 (Wyo. 1992) ("the State did not present either direct 
or circumstantial evidence of unlawful entry"--instead, it sought 
the Court's sanction for proving a single charge of burglary by 
establishing that a building was burned, and permitting that to 
give rise to the inference that defendant had no permission to 
set the fire and therefore entered the building unlawfully). 
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That circumstantial evidence may be used to prove guilt is 
well-established. See State v. Blubauah, 904 P.2d 688, 694 (Utah 
App. 1995) (acknowledging that guilt may be based solely on 
circumstantial evidence), cert, denied. 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996); 
see also State v. Span. 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) (upholding 
arson conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence). 
Clearly, such evidence, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, 
may be used to meet the State's burden of establishing guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the determination of weight and 
sufficiency is then left for the jury. Accordingly, to the 
extent the jury regarded the evidence establishing entry into 
seven of the units as circumstantial evidence bearing on the 
entry element of the remaining six units, the use of the evidence 
would not "circumvent" or "avoid" the State's duty to establish 
the element of entry as to all charged burglaries, as defendant 
asserts. Appellant's Br. at 13-14. Indeed, under the facts of 
this case--a series of thirteen burglaries committed in a single 
storage facility at the same time and in the same manner tried 
together in a single trial--such circumstantial evidence is 
readily available, uniquely appropriate, and compelling. It does 
not change the State's ability to use the circumstantial evidence 
to meet its burden as to any of the charged offenses. 
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EL. The Evidence was Sufficient To Support Defendant'? 
Convictions 
The question becomes whether the evidence adduced was 
sufficient to support the convictions. Defendant claims that the 
remaining evidence--that the locks on the six challenged units 
were cut and the doors were open--is insufficient to establish 
that the units were entered, as is required for a burglary 
conviction. Appellant's Br. at 15-16. 
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence below, an 
appellate court must view the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
verdict and will not reverse unless the evidence is sufficiently 
"inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he . . . was convicted." State v. Souza, 846 
P.2d 1313, 1322 (Utah App. 1993) (quotation omitted); State v. 
Vigil, 840 P.2d 788, 792-93 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied. 857 
P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). When dealing with circumstantial evidence, 
this Court must determine whether there is "sufficient competent 
evidence'1 to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that defendant committed the crime. £££ Blubaugh. 904 P.2d at 
695. 
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Defendant challenges only the "entry" element of six of the 
charged burglaries. Assuming, arguendo. that the jury should not 
have considered the evidence of entry into the unchallenged seven 
units when determining whether the six challenged units were 
entered, there is still sufficient evidence from which the jury 
could reasonably have inferred that the units were entered. 
Defendant does not contest the State's proof that the burglar cut 
the locks on each of the six units, then opened each of the doors 
with the intent to commit theft. He also fails to contest the 
fact that none of the affected owners knew him, and none of them 
gave him permission to open or enter their unit. The State 
adduced evidence that there were no lights in the affected area 
of the facility, and that none of the units had lights in them 
(R. 481-82); in other words, entry was likely necessary in order 
for the individual to see what was inside each unit. Finally, 
the evidence establishes that defendant was "obviously attempting 
to turn into the driveway" of the facility at 2:00 a.m. and that 
he was not renting a storage unit at that facility (R. 506-08, 
550, 553-55, 603). From this evidence, it is reasonable to infer 
that the burglar did not know what was in any given unit before 
he opened it, that, after taking time to open them, he looked 
through each of the six units to determine what, if anything, he 
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would steal, that he was returning to the facility to burglarize 
additional units, and that he was so bent on profiting from his 
actions that he gave the unlit units more than a cursory review 
from the doorway, even if that involved merely walking far enough 
into a given unit to shine his flashlight on whatever was stored 
in the back. Accordingly, there was sufficient competent 
evidence giving rise to reasonable inferences which would permit 
the jury to reasonably find the required entry into the 
challenged units. 
On the other hand, it is not reasonable to infer, as 
defendant suggests, that the burglar went to the trouble of 
breaking into the storage facility under the cover of darkness, 
finding a relatively secluded area, cutting numerous locks, and 
looking into the units, only to give the dark units a cursory 
review from outside the door to determine whether each unit 
contained anything that might reward his efforts. While the 
contents of these six units might not have warranted the 
disruptive searching evident in some of the other units, it is 
unreasonable to believe that defendant, having taken the time and 
effort to open these units, being bent on finding items he could 
use or profit from, and apparently having nothing but a 
flashlight with which to illuminate the contents of each unlit 
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unit, would not at least step into the unit and look at the 
things in the back to be sure he was not missing anything before 
moving to the next unit. Even at best, defendant's 
interpretation is no more legitimate than the one advanced above, 
requiring rejection of his argument. State v. Bradley. 752 P.2d 
874, 877 (Utah 1985) ("The existence of . . . conflicting 
inferences does not warrant disturbing the jury's verdict."). 
However, as established previously, the jury was in fact 
permitted to include in its deliberations on the six challenged 
units the evidence relating to the manner and circumstances of 
the invasion of the remaining seven units. Further, the jury had 
before it the fact that the six challenged units (highlighted 
below) were randomly interspersed among the burglarized units: 
307. 308, 222., 451, 452, 453, 15£, ±5£, 458, 2££, 202, 708, 711. 
This provided additional evidence relating to the pattern and 
consistency of the thief's actions. Not only did it establish a 
repetitive pattern of cutting locks, opening doors, and entering 
unit after unit to look for worthwhile objects--which pattern the 
jury could reasonably have inferred was followed for every unit, 
not just seven of them--but it demonstrated that defendant did 
not take only what he could see from the doorway of the units. 
Instead, he "rummaged" through the interior of some units, taking 
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things he apparently deemed to be useful either to himself or to 
someone who might pay for them. This renders it highly unlikely 
that he merely stood at the doorway of these six units and, based 
on that cursory view of the units' contents, decided that none of 
the units harbored anything of use to him. 
Moreover, the jury found the evidence and reasonable 
inferences therefrom to be sufficiently persuasive to warrant 
conviction in the face of instructions detailing the elements and 
the State's burden of proof as to each separate charge, and after 
hearing defendant specifically argue in closing that the State 
had failed to meet its burden on the element of entry as to the 
challenged units (R. 151, 170-82, 766-67). Accordingly, there 
was sufficient competent evidence before the jury to permit a 
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the 
challenged burglaries. ££. Blubaugh. 904 P.2d at 695. 
POINT II 
TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE MARCH 29 BURGLARIES WAS 
NEITHER ADMITTED NOR USED PURSUANT TO RULE 404(b); 
INSTEAD, THE EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED PURSUANT TO 
RULE 403; EVEN IF ITS ADMISSION WAS ERRONEOUS, IT WAS 
HARMLESS IN THIS CASE 
&j. introduction 
Over defendant's objection, the trial court permitted the 
State's witnesses to make limited references to a similar 
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burglary of several units in the same area of the same storage 
facility the night before the ones with which defendant was 
charged. 
Five of the State's witnesses made some reference to the 
March 29 burglaries. The first was Cindy Beard, owner of unit 
#711, which was burglarized on both nights. She provided very 
emotional testimony concerning several large items belonging to 
her family which were taken on the second night. (Her relevant 
testimony is attached as addendum D.) In the course of her 
testimony, she did what the prosecutor predicted in his opening 
statement that she would do: compare two photographs of the 
contents of her unit to identify a number of the items stolen in 
the second burglary (R. 403, 455-57). Addendum D. One 
photograph was taken after the March 29 burglary, and the other 
was taken after the March 30 burglary (id,). 
The second witness who mentioned the earlier burglaries was 
Marilyn Taylor, who managed the storage facility with her 
husband. She explained what happened on the 29th after the 
police woke them up, identified on a picture of the facility the 
number and location of the units involved in the first burglary, 
and noted that on both nights the burglarized units were in an 
area farthest away from the managers' home (R. 482-86). (Her 
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relevant testimony is attached as addendum E.) She then 
explained that if the victims of the first burglary failed to 
appear at the facility that day, the witness and her husband put 
locks on those units and made periodic checks throughout the day 
to ensure that every unit was locked (R. 488-90). Addendum E. 
The third and fourth witnesses making reference to the 
earlier burglaries were Officers Danny Benzon and Scott Ricks, 
who discovered the burglaries on both nights. Each officer 
briefly explained what he did on March 29, then went into detail 
on his activities of the 30th (R. 502-04, 549-50).4 (Their 
relevant testimony is attached as addenda F and G, respectively.) 
The final State's witness to address the March 29 burglaries 
was Wesley Taylor, manager of the facility. He explained that in 
the six years he'd been with the facility, there had been no 
burglaries until March 29 and 30, that after the March 29 
burglaries he made several inspections of the locks on all the 
units, and that everything was securely locked when he closed at 
the end of that day (R. 592-95). (His relevant testimony is 
4Officer Benzon made one additional reference to the March 
29 burglaries on re-direct examination, clarifying a point 
defendant had raised for impeachment purposes concerning the 
officer's preliminary hearing testimony (compare R. 528-29 and 
540-41). 
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attached as addendum H.) He also used the pictures taken of 
Cindy Beard's unit after each burglary to verify his testimony 
that he had seen the contents of the unit on both days and knew 
that several items were taken in the March 30 burglary (R. 598-
99). Addendum H. 
The lower court found rule 404(b) to be inapplicable to this 
situation (R. 786-88). Despite this, defendant claims that the 
trial court's decision to admit the testimony concerning the 
March 29 burglaries was actually based on rule 404(b) and that 
such an admission was erroneous. Appellant's Br. at 17-18. He 
argues that the evidence should have been excluded under rule 
404(b) because it was not required to explain the context and 
circumstances of the March 30 burglaries, it could not 
appropriately demonstrate a common scheme or modus operandi, and 
it was not sufficiently probative of the identity of the March 30 
thief. Id. at 19-25. Further, he claims that even if the 
evidence was admissible under rule 404(b), it should have been 
excluded under rule 403 because its probative value was 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Id. at 25-
28. 
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EJ. The Trial Court Denied Defendant's Motion To Exclude The 
Evidence After Finding Rule 404(b) Inapplicable To This 
Situation 
Although defendant objected to evidence concerning the March 
29 burglaries early in the trial, he was unable to make his 
record until after closing arguments were given (R. 391-93, 468-
70, 673-76, 785-87) (these pages are attached as addendum I). At 
that time, the trial court made the following ruling: 
THE COURT: . . . First of all I don't think we're talking 
about prior bad acts because there is no indication that I 
can think--it was a complete denial that the defendants had 
anything to do with the activities of the 29th. 
The circumstances and the pattern of those activities 
seem to me to be relevant in allowing a full development of 
the case, and to exclude that would be to eliminate that 
opportunity. In addition to that, it would seem to me that 
there was a relationship that could be established between 
the earlier activity and the present activity that had some 
probative significance to the alleged activities of 
defendants on the 30th. 
And finally, in looking at the way in which the effect 
of that evidence was either prejudicial as against 
probative, I'm certain that [the prosecutor] didn't do it 
intentionally, but my own reading of the evidence was that 
it probably helped the defendants more than it hurt them, 
simply because the credibility of their activities the night 
before, particularly with respect to Mr. Jennings, would 
have made it more difficult to believe that he had anything 
to do with the activities of the night after that. 
I think that's what [the prosecutor], I think, is 
saying. I don't think he said he did it intentionally, but 
that's kind of how that came out. So I don't think there's 
a prejudice as a result. 
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(R. 787-88) (the full ruling is attached as addendum J). In 
other words, the trial court rejected rule 404(b) as being 
inapplicable to the question of the admissibility of the 
evidence, ruling instead that the testimony had probative value 
and that the probativeness was not substantially outweighed by 
the potential for undue prejudice, pursuant to rule 403. 
£*. Rule 404(b) Does Not govern The Question of The 
Admissibility of Testimony Concerning The March 29 
Burglaries 
That rule 404(b) does not apply to this issue is clear from 
the record. At the time of trial, it had not been determined 
whether defendant was connected to the acts of the 29th. Absent 
a sufficient connection, the evidence can't be used in the manner 
prohibited by the rule: because defendant committed the March 29 
burglaries, he must have committed the March 30 burglaries. 
Therefore, the testimony would not be governed by rule 404(b). 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b); 2 J. B. Weinstein & M. A. Berger, 
Weinstein's Evidence. 404-61 to 404-62 (1994) [hereinafter 
"Weinstein's Evidence"! (although the prior bad act need not have 
resulted in formal charges or a conviction, there must be some 
"proof that the defendant was sufficiently connected to the other 
offense" to warrant its use against defendant at trial). 
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Although the prosecutor originally intended to try to tie 
defendant to the earlier burglaries and to establish a common 
plan or scheme, this strategy was halted before trial ever began. 
Immediately prior to trial, defendant submitted a motion in 
limine to exclude any evidence regarding the fact that the 
keyboard found in his Jeep was related to the March 29 burglaries 
(R. 376-78). Addendum B. He anticipated that the State would 
use the keyboard to establish his possession of stolen property, 
and, because he had only learned that morning that the State had 
a witness who could potentially tie the property to the March 29 
burglaries, sought to have the keyboard excluded from evidence 
or, alternatively, to have the possession charge severed and 
tried separately (R. 376-79). Addendum B. The prosecutor 
responded that he would not use the keyboard for the possession 
charge, but intended to offer it 
just for purposes of identification, tying them [the 
burglaries] together with a common scheme or plan of the 
night before . . . . The locks are cut and there are items 
taken. One of the items taken is this keyboard . . . . This 
merely ties them together and shows, okay, he's in 
possession of property that was taken the night before, and 
I think that shows that there was a common scheme on both 
nights to go cut the locks, take the property. 
(R. 379-80). Addendum B. Defendant thereafter withdrew his 
request for severance of the count (R. 383), but prevailed on his 
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motion to exclude the evidence linking the keyboard with the 
March 29 burglaries (R. 387). Addendum B. The trial court based 
its ruling solely on the State's discovery violation (id.). 
Having lost the ability to tie defendant to the March 29 
burglaries by establishing his possession of property taken in 
the course of those burglaries, the State's ability to establish 
a common plan or scheme necessarily abated, as the State did not 
adduce, and presumably did not possess, any other evidence that 
defendant was involved in the March 29 burglaries. See 
Weinstein's Evidence. 404-61 to 404-62 (there must be some "proof 
that the defendant was sufficiently connected to the other 
offense" to warrant its use against defendant at trial). The 
record does not show any formal charge or conviction of defendant 
for the March 29 burglaries, and, as the trial court recognized, 
defendant "completely denied doing it" (R. 787). Moreover, at no 
time after the court made the above pre-trial ruling did the 
prosecutor demonstrate any further intent to establish a common 
plan or scheme or to prove defendant's responsibility for the 
earlier burglaries, even when justifying his use of the March 29 
testimony while making the post-trial record of defendant's 
objection to that evidence (R. 784-88). Addendum I. 
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Accordingly, where the acts of the 29th were not tied to 
defendant, rule 404(b)'s prohibition against admitting prior acts 
evidence to prove the character of an accused has no application. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b); Weinstein's Evidence. 404-61 to 404-62. 
JL. The Trial Court Properly Admitted The Evidence Pursuant To 
Rule 4P3 Because It Was Relevant And Its Prpbativeness Was 
Net Substantially Outweighed By Any Danger Q£ Unfair 
Prejudice 
The question, as defendant originally argued it below, is 
one of relevance and probativeness (R. 468-69). The trial court 
correctly resolved it in favor of admission. See United States 
v. Mihm, 13 F.3d 1200, 1204 (8th Cir. 1994) (the admissibility of 
evidence regarding marijuana growing in a place other than that 
charged and not strongly linked to defendant was a question of 
relevancy, not prior acts). Under rule 403, relevant evidence 
may be excluded wif its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . ." (The rule 
is reproduced in addendum A,) On appeal, the trial court's 
decision to admit evidence under rule 403 is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion, i.e., whether the ruling went "beyond the 
limits of reasonability.#/ State v. Blubaugh. 904 P.2d 688, 699 
(Utah App. 1995), cert, denied. 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996) 
(quotation omitted). Where the lower court is found to have 
31 
erred, the appellate court will reverse only if the error was 
harmful--if, absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood 
of a more favorable outcome. Id. 
The fact that the trial court did not expressly mention rule 
403 in making a record of its decision to admit the evidence does 
not change the fact that it employed the appropriate analysis 
under the rule, making findings of relevance and weighing the 
probativeness of the evidence against the potential for prejudice 
(R. 787-88). Addendum J. State v. Troyer. 910 P.2d 1182, 1191 
(Utah 1995) (failure to label an analysis as relating to rule 403 
does not change the fact that the trial court employed the rule 
to make its decision); £&& Hall yt Process Instruments & Controlr 
Inc.. 890 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Utah) (the exact language or 
terminology used is not conclusive as to whether the trial court 
employed the correct analysis), aff'd. 890 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1995). 
The record supports the trial court's determination that the 
probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed 
by the potential for prejudice. Regardless of who committed the 
March 29 burglaries, their occurrence explained, in large part, 
the actions, knowledge and credibility of certain witnesses in 
this case, rendering the evidence relevant and admissible. 
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The references made by each of the State's witnesses who 
mentioned the March 29 burglaries were relevant to each witness' 
subsequent actions on March 29 and 30 and/or to the witness' 
credibility. The pictures used by Cindy Beard were highly 
relevant to the case as they corroborated her testimony about 
what was taken from her unit, demonstrated the existence and the 
size of the items, and verified her claim that the items were 
taken during the March 30 burglary. The mere fact that one 
picture was taken as a result of the March 29 burglary does 
nothing to associate defendant with that uncharged burglary. The 
limited testimony concerning the March 29 burglary which the 
witness gave in conjunction with the pictures was relevant to 
explain why she happened to have a photograph of her unit's 
contents taken the day before the charged burglary occurred, and 
to verify why she was so certain that the items were removed 
during the March 30 burglary. Her limited discussion of the 
earlier burglary did not tie defendant to the offense or detail 
any of the similarities in the events of the two nights. 
Accordingly, the probative value of the evidence was not 
substantially outweighed by any prejudice from the witness' 
testimony. 
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Marilyn Taylor's testimony about the March 29 burglaries was 
relevant not only because it helped to establish that the March 
30 burglaries in fact occurred despite the fact that a 
corresponding lock was not discovered for every unit charged, but 
because it was probative of the witness' credibility, explaining 
why she was able to specifically remember her actions immediately 
before and after the March 30 burglaries, despite almost six 
years of managing the facility, and why she was so certain that 
each of the charged units had been securely locked before the 
March 30 burglaries occurred. Although the testimony established 
some of the similarities in the events of both nights, it did not 
tie defendant to the earlier burglaries or inflame the passions 
of the jury against defendant. 
As noted in the prosecutor's opening statement, testimony 
from the two investigating officers concerning the March 29 
burglaries helped to explain why the officers acted as they did 
on March 30 (R. 400)--specifically why the open gate got their 
attention, why they acted so quickly upon seeing it, and why one 
of them immediately drove through the facility. It was also 
probative of the officers' credibility inasmuch as it 
demonstrated that they were not confusing their actions regarding 
the March 30 burglaries with their actions of the previous night. 
34 
Again, the testimony necessarily presented some of the 
similarities in the burglaries of both nights, but the mere 
existence of similarities does not establish that defendant was 
involved on both nights. This is clear from the testimony that 
during April, while the defendant was in jail, the facility was 
again burglarized by someone using bolt cutters to cut off 
numerous locks (R. 609). 
The references made by Wesley Taylor to the March 29 
burglaries were directly probative in helping the jury judge the 
witness' credibility because they established that he was not 
confusing the March 30 burglary with any other burglary the 
facility had suffered and that he had reason to be certain about 
the charged units being secure immediately before the March 30 
burglaries. Further, his use of the photographs, the 
corresponding explanation as to his familiarity with the contents 
of Cindy Beard's unit, and the fact that several items that had 
been there after the first burglary were missing after the 
second, provided corroboration for Cindy's testimony. 
Overall, the evidence admitted regarding the March 29 
burglaries helped to establish that the burglaries in fact 
occurred on March 30 and was relevant to the jury's determination 
of witness credibility. Any prejudicial value inherent in the 
35 
evidence necessarily stemmed from its probative value in 
supporting or explaining the State's case against defendant and 
strengthening the credibility of the State's witnesses. However, 
the mere fact that evidence is prejudicial does not render the 
evidence inadmissible. State v. Ramirez. 924 P.2d 366, 369-70 
(Utah App. 1996). 
Further, the limited nature of the testimony acted to reduce 
any possible prejudice to defendant. Although it permitted the 
jury to hear limited details of the first burglaries, it did not 
establish either the presence or the involvement of defendant in 
those acts, and it did not highlight any remarkable or unusual 
fact or circumstance common to both nights. The trial court 
excluded the only evidence which might have tied defendant to the 
earlier burglary (R. 387), and nothing adduced by the State 
provided the identity of the individuals involved in the March 29 
burglaries. £££ First ggflt Servs, v, Perkins, 918 P.2d 480, 485 
(Utah App. 1996) (challenged evidence relating to a "suspicious 
and intentionally set fire" was properly admitted where the 
evidence was limited "so as to reduce its possible prejudicial 
effect" and the trial court excluded evidence of defendant's 
involvement in the fire). Even the bolt cutters, expressly tied 
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to the March 30 burglaries, were not tied to the earlier 
burglaries. 
Moreover, defendant in fact took advantage of the testimony 
to distance himself from the March 29 burglaries and, thereby, 
lend more credibility to his claim of innocence for the March 30 
burglaries, as was suggested by the trial court. Defendant did 
not provide alibi testimony similar to that of his co-defendant, 
which put the co-defendant somewhere else at the time of the 
March 29 burglaries. Instead, defendant offered the testimony of 
his father-in-law, who owned the bolt cutters found in 
defendant's Jeep, that the bolt cutters were locked in his tool 
box until he gave them to defendant sometime during the day of 
March 29th (R. 697-703); in other words, defendant had no bolt 
cutters with which to cut the locks until after the burglaries 
had occurred in the early morning hours of March 29. 
Any potential prejudice which might have arisen from the 
evidence was further mitigated in this case by the jury 
instructions directing the jury to decide defendant's guilt or 
innocence of the March 30 burglaries, explaining the State's 
burden of proof as to each element of each offense, and 
identifying each of the individuals victimized in the March 30 
burglaries (R. 151, 170-82). In addition, defense counsel 
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stressed to the jury in both his opening and closing remarks that 
the burglaries occurring on March 29 were not charged and were 
not at issue (R. 407, 762). The only mention of March 29 in the 
prosecutor's closing remarks was an indirect reference to the 
fact that several items in unit #711 were there the day before 
the charged burglaries but were gone the next day, and that the 
owner, Cindy Beard, was upset after the first night and angry 
after the second (R. 753) (attached as addendum K). Consequently, 
under the circumstances of this case, even assuming there was 
some danger of unfair prejudice, that danger did not 
substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence, and 
the trial court's admission of the evidence was not an abuse of 
discretion. See State v. Smith. 927 P.2d 649, 654 (Utah App. 
1996) (where evidence of a manslaughter charge was probative of 
motive and intent regarding two other charged offenses, its 
probative value outweighed any natural prejudice arising from the 
evidence). 
£*. Even Assuming Error. Remand Is Not Warranted Because The 
Error was Harmless 
Finally, even if the testimony should have been excluded, 
its erroneous admission would be harmless. There was substantial 
evidence supporting defendant's convictions of the March 30 
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burglaries independent of the earlier burglaries, including: his 
possession the night of the charged burglaries of bolt cutters 
conclusively tied to a lock found at the facility and cut in the 
March 30 burglaries and to a lock found in defendants Jeep and 
belonging to the storage facility; his possession the same night 
of several locks established to have been on some of the units 
burglarized on the 30th; his aborted turn into the facility 
followed by his illegal driving on the wrong side of the road; 
and his voluntary, unprovoked statements upon being stopped by 
the officers that *I haven't stolen anything" and *Mr. Jennings 
had nothing to do with it" (R. 539-40, 556, 566, 669-70). 
Consequently, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury 
would have believed defendant's alibi defense and acquitted him 
absent the testimony about the March 29 burglaries. See State v. 
Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992) (any error in admission 
of evidence in violation of rule 403 was harmless where there was 
no substantial likelihood that the outcome would have been 
different absent admission of the evidence). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^Jp/"cLay of May, 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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South, Ste. 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this cp/^day of 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or 
commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a 
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
History: C. 1958, 76-6-202, enacted by L. Crow-References. —Agreement to commit 
1073, ch. 196, § 76-6-202. burglary, conspiracy, § 76-4-201. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Adviaory Committee Note. — Thia role ia testimony in capital caae ruled prejudicial and 
the federal rule, verbatim, and ia aubetantively violation of due proceaa). See the following 
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence Utah caeee to the aame effect. Terry v. Ziona 
(1971) except that "aurpriee* ia not included aa Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 814 (Utah 
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The 1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 
change in language ia not one of aubetance, 1960); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 
since "surprise" would be within the concept of 1982). 
"unfair prejudice" aa contained in Rule 402 Compiler's Notea. — The bracketed refer-
[Rule 403]. See also Adviaory Committee Note ence to "Rule 403M in the Adviaory Committee 
to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a contin- Note to Rule 403 was inserted becauae Rule 
uance in most instances would be a more ap- 402 does not refer to "unfair prejudice11 and 
propriate method of dealing with "surprise.* Rule 403 appears to be the correct reference. 
See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 Croaa-Referenoea. — Admissibility of evi-
(N.D. Tex 1977} (surprise use of psychiatric dance, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a). 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a 
trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in confor-
mity therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character 
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of 
the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the 
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that 
the victim was the first aggressor; 
. (S) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as 
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other pur-
poses, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
(Amended* effective October 1, 1992.) 
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THE COURT: DO YOU PLAN ON PUTTING EVIDENCE ON 
RESPECT TO EACH ONE OF THE 13 STORAGE— 
MR. BLAYLOCK: YES. SOME EVIDENCE MAY COME 
MANAGERS THERE, AND MOST OF THE EVIDENCE WILL COME 
THE INDIVIDUALS WHOSE STORAGE FACILITIES, THOSE WHO 
WERE— RENTED STORAGE FACILITIES. 
THE COURT: ARE YOU GOING TO PRESENT EVIDENCE 
AS TO EACH OF THE 13 THAT STATE THAT THERE HAS BEEN ENTRY 
OTHER THAN JUST THE FACT THAT THE DOORS WERE OPEN? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: WE'RE TALKING ABOUT 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. OKAY? 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: AND WE DON'T HAVE A VIDEO TAPE 
SHOWING SOMEBODY GOING INTO THESE STORAGE FACILITIES, BUT 
WE DO HAVE EVIDENCE THAT ITEMS HAVE BEEN TAKEN FROM AT 
LEAST ONE OF THOSE. 
THE COURT: ONE OF THE THIRTEEN? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: AT LEAST ONE, BECAUSE THE 
DEFENDANTS WERE IN POSSESSION— THE VEHICLE IN WHICH 
MR. SPRAGUE AND MR. JENNINGS WERE RIDING HAD A COMPUTER 
BOARD AND THEY THINK THAT'S— I JUST RECEIVED A MOTION IN 
LIMINE TODAY WITH REGARDS TO THAT COMPUTER BOARD. SO I 
GUESS WE NEED TO DISCUSS THAT. 
THE COURT: I HAVEN'T SEEN THIS. 
MR. ANDERSON: AND, YOUR HONOR, AS FAR AS 
8 
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1 PROPERTY BEING TAKEN, I KNOW THAT THERE WERE SOME STORAGE 
2 FACILITIES, AND I'M LOOKING AT A PROPERTY ENTRY WHERE THE 
3 OFFICERS OBVIOUSLY CALLED THE OWNERS, AND THE OWNERS, 
4 THEY CAME DOWN AND LOOKED THROUGH THE FACILITIES. AND I 
5 REMEMBER ON SEVERAL ENTRIES THE NOTATION WAS "NO PROPERTY 
6 TAKEN." 
7 IT'S OUR POSITION THAT IN THIS SITUATION, THERE 
8 IS INADEQUATE— THE STATE DOES NOT HAVE ADEQUATE EVIDENCE 
9 TO SHOW THAT THERE WAS THE ENTRY UNDER 76-6-201, UNDER 
10 THE BURGLARY STATUTE IN THE WAY "ENTER" IS DEFINED TO 
11 QUALIFY AS BURGLARY, AND THAT THOSE CASES, UNLESS THE 
12 STATE HAS EVIDENCE BEYOND WHAT WE HAVE BEEN PRESENTED 
13 WITH OR THE INDIVIDUALS COMING TO TESTIFY, I WOULD ASK 
14 THE COURT TO NOT ALLOW THE STATE TO TALK ABOUT THOSE 
15 COUNTS, INITIALLY, IF THEY DO NOT HAVE ANY MORE EVIDENCE 
16 SIMPLY OTHER THAN THE FACT THAT THE LOCK WAS CUT. 
17 THERE WAS EVEN A DISPUTE IN THE PRELIMINARY 
18 HEARING TRANSCRIPT AS TO WHETHER ALL OF THE DOORS WERE 
19 OPEN OR NOT, AND I HAVE NEVER SEEN A LISTING AS TO 
20 EXACTLY WHICH STORAGE UNITS THE DOORS WERE OPEN AND WHICH 
21 STORAGE UNITS THE LOCK WAS JUST CUT OFF. 
22 THE COURT: DID YOU WANT TO RESPOND? 
23 I MR. BLAYLOCK: AGAIN, I SUGGEST WE'RE TALKING 
24 ABOUT THIS PREMATURELY. I THINK THIS IS ALL 
25 CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND THOSE ARE ALL THE FACTS THAT 
9 
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1 OUR JURY SHOULD BE ABLE TO COVER IN MAKING A 
2 DETERMINATION OF WHETHER OR NOT THERE WERE BURGLARIES OF 
3 THESE INDIVIDUAL UNITS. 
4 YOUR HONOR, OUR POSITION IS IT'S NOT 
5 PREJUDICIAL TO SAY THERE ARE 13 COUNTS. THE COURT IS 
6 GOING TO HAVE TO READ THE INFORMATION, AND THE 
7 INFORMATION TALKED ABOUT 13 COUNTS, 13 DIFFERENT VICTIMS 
8 AND 2 ADDITIONAL COUNTS. SO THE JURY IS GOING TO KNOW 
9 ABOUT THOSE, AND WHETHER OR NOT I ADDRESS THEM IN MY 
10 OPENING ARGUMENT OR NOT, I SUGGEST, ISN'T GOING TO BE 
11 PREJUDICIAL ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. IF I MAKE A 
12 MISSTATEMENT AS TO WHAT EVIDENCE WILL BE SHOWN, THEN I'M 
13 MORE LIKELY GOING TO HANG THE STATE'S CASE ON THOSE 
14 PARTICULAR ISSUES AND BE MORE PREJUDICIAL TO THE JURY 
15 WHEN THEY'RE INSTRUCTED THAT WHAT WE SAY ISN'T EVIDENCE 
16 ANYWAY AND THEY HAVE TO LISTEN TO WHAT THE EVIDENCE IS. 
17 AND SO FOR COUNSEL TO ARGUE ABOUT WHAT SHOULDN'T BE 
18 DISCUSSED I THINK IS PREMATURE. 
19 THE COUNTS ARE THERE. BOTH DEFENDANTS WERE 
20 BOUND OVER ON 15 COUNTS. EVEN THE COURT WILL HAVE TO 
21 INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT'S WHAT THEY'RE CHARGED WITH. IF I 
22 CAN'T PROVE IT, I CAN'T PROVE IT. THAT'S A MATTER OF 
23 WHAT THE WITNESSES SAY, AND WHAT COULD BE INFERRED FROM 
24 THE EVIDENCE THAT'S FOUND AT THE SCENE. 
25 THE COURT: WELL, I THINK I'M GOING TO GO AHEAD 
10 
1 AND PROCEED WITH THE 13 COUNTS. AND YOU MADE YOUR 
2 RECORD, MR. ANDERSON. 
3 IS THERE ANYTHING— NOW, THERE'S A MOTION IN 
4 LIMINE THAT I HAVEN'T SEEN. 
5 MR. BLAYLOCK: I JUST RECEIVED THAT THIS 
6 MORNING. 
7 THE COURT: WHO FILED THAT? 
8 I MR. YOUNGBERG: THIS IS MINE, JUDGE. 
9 JUST AS I GOT TO COURT THIS MORNING, 
10 MR. BLAYLOCK HANDED ME A WITNESS STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT 
11 THAT THE KEYBOARD THAT WAS FOUND IN MR. SPRAGUE'S VEHICLE 
12 HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED BY THE SON-IN-LAW OF AN IDENTIFIED 
13 PERSON AS BEING IN ONE OF THE STORAGE UNITS. 
14 IF CAN YOU, FILL ME IN ON WHAT UNIT. 
15 MR. BLAYLOCK: NUMBER 64. 
16. MR. ANDERSON: WHAT NUMBER? 
17 MR. YOUNGBERG: ANYWAY THAT'S THE MOTION WE'RE 
18 TALKING ABOUT. 
19 MR. BLAYLOCK: NUMBER 64. ELLEN DAVENPORT. 
20 I MR. YOUNGBERG: THAT'S FROM A BURGLARY THAT 
21 OCCURRED THE NIGHT BEFORE, NOT THE BURGLARY THAT'S 
22 CHARGED IN THIS CASE. 
23 IT'S MY POSITION, JUDGE, THAT AT THE 
24 PRELIMINARY HEARING NO EVIDENCE WAS BROUGHT FORWARD ABOUT 
25 THE COMPUTER KEYBOARD BEING STOLEN. WHAT WAS PRESENTED 
11 
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AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING AS TO COUNT 15 IS THAT THE 
DEFENDANT WAS IN POSSESSION OF A STOLEN LOCK, OKAY, THAT 
HAD BEEN TAKEN THAT NIGHT. 
WHAT THE PROSECUTOR IS PLANNING ON DOING, I 
ASSUME FROM THAT, IS TRY TO PROVE POSSESSION OF STOLEN 
PROPERTY USING THIS COMPUTER KEYBOARD THAT WAS TAKEN IN 
AN EARLIER— PROBABLY AN EARLIER BURGLARY FROM THE SAME 
PLACE. 
JUDGE, THERE ARE SEVERAL PROBLEMS WITH THAT, AS 
I SEE IT. 
UNDER 77-88-1 IT TALKS ABOUT JOINDER OF 
OFFENSES AND DEFENDANTS. UNDER SUBSECTION FOUR THE COURT 
CAN MAKE A RULING THAT IF A DEFENDANT OR THE PROSECUTION 
IS PREJUDICED BY A JOINDER OF OFFENSES IN AN INDICTMENT 
OR INFORMATION THAT THE COURT SHALL ORDER AN ELECTION OF 
SEPARATE TRIALS, OF SEPARATE COUNTS. 
OUR POSITION IS THAT AT THE PRELIM PROSECUTION 
WAS GOING FORWARD WITH POSSESSION OF A STOLEN LOCK, AND 
NOW WE COME TO TRIAL AND GO FORWARD FROM POSSESSION OF 
THE STOLEN PROPERTY FROM A PREVIOUS EPISODE, WHICH IS 
HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL TO MR. SPRAGUE AND MR. JENNINGS AS 
WELL, BECAUSE NOT ONLY ARE THEY BEING CHARGED WITH A 
BURGLARY THAT OCCURRED ON THE 29TH, BUT THEY'RE ALSO 
BEING ACCUSED OF BEING IN POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY 
FROM A BURGLARY THAT OCCURRED ON THE 2 8TH. 
12 
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1 MR. ANDERSON: THE BURGLARY THEY'RE CHARGED 
2 WITH OCCURRED ON THE 30TH. 
3 I MR. YOUNGBERG: LATE NIGHT. 
4 MR. ANDERSON: EARLY MORNING OF THE 30TH THERE 
5 WAS A BURGLARY— EARLY MORNING ON THE 29TH WHERE A LOT OF 
6 PROPERTY WAS TAKEN OUT OF DIFFERENT STORAGE FACILITIES. 
7 THERE'S ONLY ONE FACILITY IN COMMON BETWEEN THE TWO 
8 BURGLARIES, AND THE PROPERTY THAT THEY'RE CLAIMING WAS 
9 FOUND IN THE SPRAGUE TRUCK RELATES TO THE BURGLARY ON THE 
10 29TH, WHICH HE HAS NOT BEEN CHARGED WITH, WHICH HE IS NOT 
11 BOUND OVER ON AND HAS HAD NO PRELIMINARY HEARING ON. 
12 I WOULD JOIN IN THE— IN FACT, I WAS GOING TO 
13 ASK THE COURT NOT TO ALLOW ANY TESTIMONY OR ANY EVIDENCE 
14 OF THE P^IOR BURGLARY ON TWO OR THREE GROUNDS, THAT THE 
15 PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OUTWEIGHS ANY PROBATIVE VALUE, AND 
16 THERE'S NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE LINKING THEM TO THAT, AND 
17 THAT THE STATEMENT, IN ITSELF, IS NOT SUFFICIENT, SIMPLY 
18 THAT THE PERSON IS SAYING THAT THE KEYBOARD WAS SIMILAR, 
19 THERE IS NO SERIAL NUMBER ON THE KEYBOARD AND THE STATE 
20 SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO EVEN TALK ABOUT THE BURGLARY, OR 
21 ANY OF THEIR WITNESSES BE ALLOWED TO TALK ABOUT THE 
22 BURGLARY ON THE 2 9TH. 
23 MR. YOUNGBERG: IT'S OUR POSITION THAT IF THEY 
24 WANT TO CHARGE WITH POSSESSING THE STOLEN KEYBOARD THEY 
25 SHOULD CHARGE THEM IN A SEPARATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
13 
•0-0-0 3 7 S 
1 BECAUSE IT'S NOT STOLEN PROPERTY IN THIS BURGLARY, AND 
2 IT'S NOT ANYTHING THAT WAS TALKED ABOUT AT THE 
3 PRELIMINARY HEARING. 
4 IN FACT THIS WITNESS STATEMENT WAS TAKEN ABOUT 
5 A WEEK AGO, MONTHS AND MONTHS AFTER THE PRELIMINARY 
6 BEARING WAS HELD. SO IT'S A SEPARATE CRIMINAL EPISODE, I 
7 SUPPOSE, AND THE PROSECUTION, IN MY OPINION, SHOULD FILE 
8 A CHARGE AGAINST THEM, IF THEY WANT TO, AS TO THAT 
9 COMPUTER KEYBOARD AND— 
10 THE COURT: ARE YOU PROPOSING THAT WE SEVER THE 
11 CASE BY POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY? 
12 MR. YOUNGBERG: IF THEY'RE GOING TO GO 
13 FORWARD— IF THE STOLEN PROPERTY IS THE KEYBOARD, YES. 
14 THE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE THAT THEY GO FORWARD ON THE LOCK 
15 I AS PLANNED. 
16 THE COURT: THE LOCK WHICH IS PART OF THIS 
17 CRIMINAL EPISODE? 
18 MR. YOUNGBERG: RIGHT. 
19 THE COURT: MR. BLAYLOCK? 
20 I MR. BLAYLOCK: THAT'S WHAT WE INTEND TO 
21 ALLEGE. WE DON'T INTEND TO ALLEGE THE STOLEN KEYBOARD. 
22 WHAT THIS IS OFFERED FOR IS JUST FOR PURPOSES OF 
23 IDENTIFICATION, TYING THEM TOGETHER WITH A COMMON SCHEME 
24 OR PLAN OF THE NIGHT BEFORE. YOU CAN'T GET ANY CLOSER IN 
25 TIME, THE NIGHT BEFORE. THESE LOCKS ARE CUT AND THERE 
14 
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1 ARE ITEMS TAKEN. ONE OF THE ITEMS TAKEN IS THIS 
2 KEYBOARD. 
3 COUNSEL, BOTH COUNSEL, HAD COPIES OF THE 
4 PICTURES OF THOSE ITEMS, AND THAT KEYBOARD IS SEEN IN THE 
5 BACK OF THE VEHICLE THAT BELONGS TO MR. SPRAGUE AND 
6 I MR. JENNINGS. OKAY. THIS MERELY TIES THEM TOGETHER AND 
7 SHOWS, OKAY, HE'S IN POSSESSION OF PROPERTY THAT WAS 
8 TAKEN THE NIGHT BEFORE, AND I THINK THAT SHOWS THAT THERE 
9 WAS A COMMON SCHEME ON BOTH NIGHTS TO GO CUT THE LOCKS, 
10 TAKE THE PROPERTY. 
11 AND IT GOES TO THE QUESTION THAT WAS RAISED 
12 EARLIER, WELL, BUT YOU CAN'T SHOW THAT THEY GOT INTO ANY 
13 OF THOSE LOCKERS. WELL, WE CAN. WHY? BECAUSE THEIR 
14 PROPERTY WAS TAKEN FROM ONE OF THE LOCKERS THAT WAS TAKEN 
15 THE NIGHT BEFORE, THAT WAS IN HIS VEHICLE. 
16 MR. YOUNGBERG: YOUR WITNESS TESTIFIED THAT IS 
17 THE SAME KEYBOARD. WHAT'S THAT IDENTIFICATION BASED ON? 
18 MR. BLAYLOCK: ON THE FACT THAT HE PURCHASED IT 
19 FOR HIS FATHER-IN-LAW AND PUT IT IN THAT LOCKER AND NOW 
2 0 IT'S GONE. IT WAS TAKEN ON THE NIGHT OF THE 2 9TH— 
21 MORNING OF THE 29TB. 
22 MR. ANDERSON: BUT, YOUR HONOR, THERE ARE NO 
23 SERIAL NUMBERS. IT'S SIMPLY THAT HE'S SAYING IT'S THE 
24 SAME BRAND. THERE ARE LOTS OF KEYBOARDS OUT ON THE 
25 MARKET AND A LOT OF COMPUTERS. 
15 
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1 MY PROBLEM, YOUR HONOR, IS THAT IT'S FORCING ME 
2 TO DEFEND TWO CASES AT ONCE. I HAVE TO NOW DEFEND THE 
3 29TH CASE AS TO MR. JENNINGS WHO IS SIMPLY A PASSENGER IN 
4 MR. SPRAGUE'S VEHICLE WHERE THE KEYBOARD IS FOUND. 
5 THERE'S NOT ANY EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY THAT MR. JENNINGS 
6 WAS WITH MR. SPRAGUE THE NIGHT BEFORE. 
7 THAT IS FORCING ME TO TRY TWO CASES. IT'S BY A 
8 COMMON SCHEME OR PLAN USUALLY THAT'S INVOLVED WHERE 
9 THERE'S A PRIOR CONVICTION AND THEY'RE TRYING TO SHOW A 
10 PATTERN OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT. IF MR. BLAYLOCK HAS 
11 SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THE KEYBOARD TO LINK THESE 
12 PEOPLE TO THAT, THEN WE NEED TO HAVE A HEARING TO 
13 DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT IT WOULD RISE NOW TO A LEVEL TO 
14 BE RELIED ON BEFORE THE JURY SHOULD HEAR IT. 
15 MR. BLAYLOCK: TWO THINGS. IT DOESN'T GO TO 
16 THE ADMISSIBILITY. THEY DON'T HAVE THE SERIAL NUMBER. 
17 IT MAY GO TO THE WEIGHT THAT THE JURY SHOULD GIVE THIS 
18 AND THAT'S— 
19 THE COURT: I DON'T THINK THE SERIAL NUMBER IS 
20 WHAT BOTHERS ME ABOUT THAT. 
21 I MR. BLAYLOCK: THE SECOND QUESTION IS, OKAY, IF 
22 COUNSEL SAYS, LOOK, WE'RE SURPRISED BY THIS, I HAVE NO 
23 OBJECTION TO GIVING THEM TIME TO LOOK AT IT, TALK TO THE 
24 WITNESSES BEFORE THOSE WITNESSES ARE CALLED. AND IF IT 
25 COMES DOWN TO A CONTINUANCE, THAT'S FINE. IF THEY FEEL 
16 
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1 THAT IT'S IMPORTANT TO THEM THAT THEY CONTINUE IT, THAT 
2 THEY HAVE A HEARING AS STATED BY MR. ANDERSON, THAT'S 
3 FINE. I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THAT. 
4 WE'RE GEARED UP TO GO TO TRIAL TODAY, BUT IF 
5 THEY FEEL IT'S UNFAIR BECAUSE OF THE SURPRISE ELEMENT, I 
6 SUGGEST TO THE COURT THAT THEY WERE AWARE OF THIS. THEY 
7. WEREN'T AWARE OF THIS PARTICULAR STATEMENT FROM THIS 
8 PARTICULAR INDIVIDUAL BECAUSE I RECEIVED THIS JUST 
9 RECENTLY, AND I SHOULD HAVE GOTTEN IT TO THEM EARLIER. 
10 IT'S JUST ONE OF THOSE THINGS THAT HAPPENS, AND I 
11 APOLOGIZE TO THE COURT AND COUNSEL. 
12 WE'RE AWARE OF THE KEYBOARD. I MADE STATEMENTS 
13 TO THEM THAT IT HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED AS COMING FROM ONE OF 
14 THE LOCKERS AND DIDN'T CLARIFY IT WAS ONE OF THE LOCKERS 
15 FROM BEFORE. AND IT WAS RECENTLY THAT I WAS ABLE TO PIN 
16. DOWN EXACTLY WHICH ONE IT WAS WHEN I TALKED TO THE 
17 MANAGERS. 
18 THE COURT: THAT'S SOMETHING THAT THEY 
19 OBVIOUSLY COULD HAVE DONE BY TALKING TO THE MANAGER OF 
20 THE FACILITY, BUT THAT WAS— THAT DIDN'T HAPPEN. SO I 
21: SEE A COUPLE OF SOLUTIONS AND THOSE ARE THE SOLUTIONS. 
22 MR. YOUNGBERG: WHAT ABOUT SEVERING? HOW ARE 
23 YOU PREJUDICED BY SEVERING IT? 
24 MR. BLAYLOCK: THE COUNT THAT'S CHARGED--
25 SEVERING WHAT? 
17 
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MR. YOUNGBERG: COUNT 15. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: COUNT 15. I WAS NOT GOING TO 
USE COUNT 15 ANYWAY. 
MR. ANDERSON: YOU WANT TO USE THE KEYBOARD TO 
ESTABLISH THE PATTERN OR THE SCHEME, TO CONVICT THEM OF 
ALL 13 BURGLARIES. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: COMMON SCHEME OR PLAN. THIS 
INDIVIDUAL THAT BURGLARIZED IT THE DAY BEFORE IS THE SAME 
INDIVIDUAL THAT BURGLARIZED IT THIS TIME. WHY? BECAUSE 
WE FOUND IT AND HE HAS THE PROPERTY. 
MR. YOUNGBERG: I WOULD RENEW MY OBJECTION, 
FORGET THE MOTION TO SEVER, AND TURN TO THE ALTERNATIVE 
MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE REFERENCE TO THE KEYBOARD IN 
THIS CASE. THAT IS EVIDENCE OF A PRIOR BAD ACT, CLEARLY 
HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL, I BELIEVE, UNDER RULES 403 AND 404. 
THERE IS ALSO— THERE'S A QUESTION OF A 
VIOLATION IN THIS SITUATION. MR. BLAYLOCK APPARENTLY 
FAXED THAT WITNESS STATEMENT OVER TO ME THIS MORNING. I 
DIDN'T GET IT BECAUSE I WAS IN COURT HERE, BUT IT WAS 
BANDED TO ME THIS MORNING. 
NOW HE HAS A CONTINUING DUTY TO PROVIDE US WITH 
THIS SORT OF INFORMATION, AND WHEN HE SAYS THAT HE 
IDENTIFIED THAT COMPUTER BOARD AS COMING OUT OF ONE OF 
THE UNITS, WE'RE DEALING WITH TWO BURGLARY NIGHTS AND 13 
UNITS ONE NIGHT, AND 7 OR 8 UNITS THE NIGHT BEFORE. 
18 
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1 THAT'S TWO. I CAN SHOW YOU THE PRELIMINARY HEARING 
2 TRANSCRIPT WHERE WE ASKED THE OFFICER DIRECTLY IF THERE 
3 WAS ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE KEYBOARD WAS STOLEN PROPERTY 
4 AND HE SAID NO. 
5 THE COURT: NOW THEY FOUND OUT THAT IT IS. 
6 MR. BLAYLOCK: THE OFFICER HE WAS ASKING WAS 
7 THE OFFICER THAT RESPONDED THE FIRST TIME. IT WASN'T THE 
8 DETECTIVE IN CHARGE OF THE CASE FOLLOWING UP DIFFERENT 
9 LEADS. SO THE OFFICER THAT HE ASKED WOULDN'T HAVE BEEN 
10 THE ONE. 
11 WHEN I SAID THAT I MENTIONED IT, IT WASN'T IN 
12 THE PRELIMINARY HEARING. IT WAS AS WE WERE DISCUSSING, 
13 SAYING, OKAY, WHAT ARE THE THINGS THAT TIE THESE 
14 INDIVIDUALS TO THE PARTICULAR EVENTS? THE COMPUTER WAS 
15. ONE OF THE THINGS THAT I MENTIONED THAT TIED THEM TO 
16 THESE EVENTS BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN TAKEN FROM ONE OF THE 
17 LOCKERS. 
18 THE COURT: MR. BLAYLOCK IS TELLING ME, IF I 
19 UNDERSTAND IT CORRECTLY, BE WOULD BE WILLING TO CONTINUE 
20 THE TRIAL ON YOUR— ONE OF YOUR POINTS, THAT IT'S A 
21 DISCOVERY VIOLATION AND YOU'RE ENTITLED TO NOTICE, AND HE 
22 DIDN'T GET IT TO YOU SOON ENOUGH. 
23 THE QUESTION IN MY MIND IS, IS THAT— IS THIS 
24 ASPECT OF THE CASE SO CRITICAL TO THIS PARTICULAR CASE 
25 THAT YOU WOULD RATHER CONTINUE IT THAN JUST GO AHEAD AND 
19 
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1 TRY IT WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE KEYBOARD? BECAUSE I 
2 THINK YOU'VE GOT THAT CHOICE. 
3 1 MR. ANDERSON: I PREFER TO GO AHEAD AND TRY THE 
4 CASE WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE KEYBOARD. I THINK THE TALK 
5 OF THE BURGLARY ON THE 29TB, THAT THERE IS NO 
6 CONVICTION— THERE HAVE BEEN NO CHARGES, ESPECIALLY 
7 REGARDING MR. JENNINGS, AS MR. BLAYLOCK EVEN SAID, HE'S 
8 THE INDIVIDUAL— IT'S MR. SPRAGUE'S CAR. THERE'S NO 
9 EVIDENCE THAT MR. JENNINGS WAS WITH MR. SPRAGUE THE NIGHT 
10 BEFORE. AND SO THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT TO MR. JENNINGS 
11 IS— YOU KNOW, HE'S JUST IN THE CAR; THE COMPUTER BOARD 
12 IS THERE. THERE'S NOT AN ALLEGATION IT WAS TAKEN THE 
13 NIGHT THAT HE WAS IN THE CAR. 
14 THE COURT: IS THERE ANY WAY YOU CAN LINK UP 
15 MR. JENNINGS TO THE COMPUTER BOARD BURGLARY THE NIGHT 
16 BEFORE OTHER THAN THE FACT THAT BE WAS IN THE CAR WHERE 
17 IT WAS FOUND? 
18 MR. BLAYLOCK: THAT'S BASICALLY IT. SO THE 
19 PROBLEM WE RUN INTO IS THAT THESE ARE CODEFENDANTS AND 
20 THEY NEED TO BE TRIED TOGETHER. 
21 THE COURT: RIGHT. 
22 MR. BLAYLOCK: AND SO IF COUNSEL IS RIGHT AND 
23 IF HE'S ABLE TO SAY THAT THERE IS NO CONNECTION WITH HIS 
24 CLIENT, THEN BIS CLIENT WILL BE RELEASED, WILL BE FOUND 
25 NOT GUILTY. 
20 
1 MR. ANDERSON: BUT, YOUR HONOR, THAT'S SHIFTING 
2 THE BURDEN TO ME. I HAVE TO PROVE THAT HE WASN'T 
3 PRESENT. I MEAN BY MAKING THE INFERENCES I THINK IS 
4 PREJUDICIAL, AND THE OFFICERS TESTIFIED THEY DON'T— 
5 THERE WERE NO WITNESSES TO THE BURGLARY ON THE 2 9TH. NOW 
6 W E — THE ONLY EVIDENCE THAT THEY SAY LINKS IT IS THIS 
7 KEYBOARD, BUT, YOU KNOW, THERE HAVE BEEN NO CHARGES 
8 REGARDING THE 29TH. TO SAY IT'S A PATTERN OF CRIMINAL 
9 CONDUCT USUALLY APPLIES WHEN THERE HAVE BEEN PRIOR 
10 CONVICTIONS. THERE HAVE BEEN NO PRIOR CONVICTIONS. 
11 THERE HAVEN'T BEEN PRIOR CHARGES. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME 
12 WE HEARD THAT THE COMPUTER BOARD CAME FROM THIS FACILITY. 
13 MR. BLAYLOCK: IT'S NOT NECESSARY THAT THERE BE 
14 PRIOR CONVICTIONS. THAT'S ABSOLUTELY NOT NECESSARY. 
15 THIS IS EVIDENCE THAT'S PROBATIVE. I SUGGEST TO THE 
16 COURT IT'S VERY PROBATIVE BECAUSE IT TIES PERSONAL 
17 PROPERTY THAT WAS BEING LOCKED IN THE STORAGE FACILITY TO 
18 THESE TWO INDIVIDUALS BECAUSE THEY ARE IN POSSESSION OF 
19 IT. IT'S IN THE VEHICLE IN WHICH THEY'RE RIDING WHICH IS 
20 BEING DRIVEN BY THEM. IT'S VERY PROBATIVE. 
21 I IS IT UNDULY PREJUDICIAL? I WOULD SUGGEST TO 
22 THE COURT, NO, IT IS NOT. ALL OF THE INFORMATION THAT WE 
23 PRESENTED ON BEHALF OF THE STATE PREJUDICES THE 
24 DEFENDANT, OTHERWISE WE WOULDN'T PRESENT IT. THAT'S THE 
25 WHOLE PURPOSE, IS TO PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT TIES 
21 
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1 INDIVIDUALS TO CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, AND THAT IS j 
2 PREJUDICIAL. ! 
3 THE QUESTION IS, IS IT UNDULY PREJUDICIAL, AND 
4 I SUGGEST THAT IT ISN'T. 
5 THE COURT: WE'VE GOT A DISCOVERY VIOLATION, I 
6 THINK, BY YOU NOT HAVING BROUGHT THAT FORWARD UNTIL NOW. 
7 I DON'T THINK IT'S INTENTIONAL, BUT I THINK, 
8 NEVERTHELESS, IT'S A PROBLEM. 
9 AND I ALSO THINK THAT THE TENUOUSNESS OF THE 
10 RELATIONSHIP OF THE COMPUTER BOARD TO AT LEAST 
11 MR. JENNINGS' SITUATION IS SUCH THAT IT'S-- UNDER RULE 
12 403, THE PREJUDICE WOULD OUTWEIGH THE PROBATIVE VALUE. 
13 SO I WON'T LET IT IN THIS TRIAL TODAY AS PART OF THE 
14 CASE. 
15 NOW, I THINK WE HAVE BEEN PUTTING THIS CASE OFF 
16 FOR A LONG TIME, SO I THINK WHAT WE BETTER DO IS GO AHEAD 
17 AND TRY IT, WITH WHAT WE HAVE GOT. 
18 IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE? 
19 MR. BLAYLOCK: WELL, YOUR HONOR, THAT PUTS US 
20 IN A POSITION WHERE WE HAVE NO RECOURSE. WHAT DO WE DO? 
21 YOU KNOW. 
22 THE COURT: WELL, ARE YOU TELLING ME THAT THE 
23 KEYBOARD WAS YOUR CASE? 
24 MR. BLAYLOCK: NO. I'M JUST SAYING THAT THIS 
25 I IS A RULING FOR WHICH I HAVE NO REMEDY, NO RECOURSE. 
22 
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JEFFERY SPRAGUE, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR ARREST 
OF JUDGMENT 
Case No. 951900792FS 
JUDGE WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, Jeffery Sprague, through counsel Robin Youngberg, 
respectfully moves this court to arrest judgment on Counts I, 
III, VII, and X of the Information. Grounds for this motion are 
that there was no evidence presented that there was an entry of 
the storage units named in those counts. 
On November 16, 1995, Jeffery Sprague was found guilty 
by a jury of thirteen counts of burglary of a non-dwelling. The 
elements of burglary require evidence that a defendant entered 
or unlawfully remained in a building with the intent to commit a 
theft. Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-201(4) defines "enter11 as: 
(a) intrusion of any part of the body; or (b) intrusion of any 
physical object under the control of the actor. 
The testimony adduced at trial as to Counts I, III, 
VII, and X indicated that although the locks on those units had 
000229 
been cut, and the doors were open to various extents, nothing 
was disturbed within the units. Thus, there was no evidence 
showing that anyone had entered the units. 
Defense counsel was unable to locate any Utah cases 
dealing with the question of whether a broken outside lock 
constitutes proof of entry. However, the history of Utah's 
burglary statute is instructive in this regard. Prior to 
Statehood, Utah had one crime of burglary, which was as follows: 
Every person who, in the night time, forcibly 
breaks and enters, or without force enters 
through any open door, window or other 
aperture, any house, room, apartment or 
tenement, . . . with intent to commit larceny 
or any felony, is guilty of burglary. 
[Sec. 4621, C.L.U. 1888]. 
In 1905, the legislature divided burglary into two 
degrees. The statute still required a "breaking and entering". 
In 1907, the legislature further divided burglary into three 
degrees, depending on whether explosives were used to gain 
entry. The "breaking and entering" language remained. It is 
clear that Utah has historically required both a "breaking" and 
an "entering" in order to convict a person of burglary. In the 
present case, the prosecution has only presented evidence of a 
"breaking", but has not shown an entry on the four counts in 
issue. 
It appears that the lack of case law on this particular 
issue stems from the fact that prosecutors rarely charge 
burglary if there is no evidence of actual entry. It is only 
the particular facts of this case that give rise to this issue. 
Oklahoma appellate courts have considered the related 
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issue of whether breaking an opening into a building can meet 
the elements of attempted burglary. In Robinson v. State, 557 
P.2d 1155 (Okl.Cr. 1977), the defendant was accused of removing 
a window fan in order to gain entry into a cafe. There was 
nothing disturbed in the cafe, and the defendant was charged and 
convicted of attempted burglary. The court noted that the 
"State in no way tried to prove actual entry into the cafe", and 
that there "was no conclusive evidence that the defendant did 
enter the cafe." 2d. at 1157. 
In the present case, the prosecutor argued, and the 
jury apparently accepted, that the demonstrated entry into other 
storage units supports an inference that all the storage units 
were entered. However, this is a fallacious argument. Rule 
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
Therefore, proof that other units were entered and robbed would 
be admissible for certain purposes, such as to show intent or to 
negate a claim of mistake, but it clearly cannot be used to 
prove physical entry by defendant. 
Obviously, each count in an Information needs to be 
considered individually, and the State has the burden to present 
evidence pertaining to each charge alleged. There is an 
inherent danger in trials in which numerous counts are alleged 
that a finding of guilt on some counts may affect deliberations 
0CC23! 
on other counts. That is precisely what happened in this case, 
For the reasons stated above, Mr. Sprague moves this 
court to arrest judgment on Counts I, III, VII, and X. 
7 
DATED this _ _ _ _ _ day of December, 1995. 
ROBIN K. ytfUNGBERG-^^ 
Attorney for Defendant^ 
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CRIMINAL NO. 951900792 
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Utah Court of Appeals 
JUL 2 5 1996 
Marilyn M. Branch 
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SHORT RECESS, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY, AND I ASK 
THAT WHILE WE'RE IN RECESS THAT YOU NOT DISCUSS THE CASE 
WITH EACH OTHER, NOT FORM ANY OPINIONS, NOT ALLOW ANYONE 
TO COMMUNICATE WITH YOU ABOUT THE CASE OR COMMUNICATE 
WITH ANYONE ABOUT THE CASE AND DO NOT BEGIN 
DELIBERATIONS. 
WE'LL BE BACK ON THE RECORD IN ABOUT TEN 
MINUTES. 
(THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HELD 
IN OPEN COURT OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE 
JURY.) 
THE COURT: THE RECORD SHOULD SHOW THE JURY HAS 
LEFT THE COURTROOM. 
MR. YOUNGBERG? 
MR. ANDERSON: YOUR HONOR, ACTUALLY IF I COULD 
PROCEED FIRST— I HAVE MADE SOME NOTATIONS OF DIFFERENT 
COUNTS. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
MR. ANDERSON: I THINK MR. YOUNGBERG WOULD JOIN 
IN THIS MOTION. 
AS PURELY A LEGAL ISSUE, WE WOULD MOVE TO 
DISMISS COUNT ONE, COUNT THREE, COUNT SEVEN, COUNT EIGHT, 
COUNT TEN, AND COUNT ELEVEN OF THE INFORMATION. 
YOUR HONOR, THE BASIS FOR THAT IS TWO OF THE 
COUNTS, COUNT THREE AND COUNT EIGHT, THE VICTIMS, ALLEGED 
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1 VICTIMS, DID NOT PROVIDE ANY TESTIMONY SO THERE'S 
2 ABSOLUTELY NOTHING IN THE RECORD REGARDING ANY ENTRY OR 
3 EVIDENCE OF ENTRY INTO THE STORAGE FACILITIES. 
4 AS TO COUNTS ONE, SEVEN, TEN, AND ELEVEN, YOUR 
5 HONOR, THE TESTIMONY OF ALL OF THOSE ALLEGED VICTIMS WAS 
6 THAT WHEN THEY LOOKED AT THE STORAGE FACILITY THEY DIDN'T 
7 THINK ANYTHING HAD BEEN MOVED AND NOTHING WAS MISSING. 
8 SO THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF AN ACTUAL ENTRY. 
9 IT IS OUR POSITION THAT THE STATUTE REQUIRES AN 
10 INTRUSION OF THE BODY OR SOME PART OF THE BODY. 
11 NOW, I KNOW CASES HELD THAT SHOOTING A BULLET 
12 INTO A HOUSE OR PUTTING A SCREW DRIVER THROUGH A WINDOW 
13 IS AN ENTRY BECAUSE THE PLAIN, THE INTERIOR TO THE 
14 BUILDING, HAS BEEN BROKEN. IN THIS CASE THE LOCK WAS 
15 CUT— WHICH IS EXTERIOR — HANDLE COULD HAVE BEEN HELD 
16 AND THE DOOR SLID OPEN AND NO ENTRY MADE, WITHOUT ANY 
17 EVIDENCE OF AN ENTRY INTO THOSE FACILITIES. 
18 WE WOULD ASK THE COURT TO DISMISS— THAT THERE 
19 ISN'T ANYTHING IN EVIDENCE AS TO THOSE COUNTS. 
2 0 I ALSO POINT OUT TO THE COURT THAT I AM NOT 
21 JUST CHOOSING THOSE AREAS WHERE NOTHING WAS TAKEN. IF 
22 THE WITNESS TESTIFIED SOMETHING HAD BEEN MOVED AROUND OR 
23 DISTURBED INSIDE, I'M NOT MOVING TO DISMISS THOSE BECAUSE 
24 I THINK THAT WOULD BE EVIDENCE OF AN ENTRY, AND THAT'S A 
25 QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY. 
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1 I THINK THE OTHERS INVOLVED LEGAL ISSUES AND 
2 THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE AT ALL IN THE RECORD OF ENTRY, 
3 OTHER THAN THE STATE'S POSITION, I THINK THAT MAYBE— 
4 WELL, THE CIRCUMSTANCE ON 11 IS THAT THEY COULD HAVE COME 
5 IN, BUT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS AN ENTRY. 
6 AND I WOULD ASK THE COURT TO DISMISS THOSE. 
7 MR. YOUNGBERG: THAT'S OUR MOTION AS WELL. 
8 THE COURT: MR. BLAYLOCK? 
9 THE COURT: JUST FOR CLARIFICATION, YOU'RE 
10 TALKING ABOUT ONE, SEVEN, TEN, AND ELEVEN, AND THAT THERE 
11 WAS NOTHING MOVED OR MISSING FROM THOSE UNITS? 
12 MR. ANDERSON: THAT'S CORRECT. 
13 MR. BLAYLOCK: AND THREE AND EIGHT, NO VICTIMS 
14 TESTIFIED? 
15 MR. ANDERSON: CORRECT. 
16 MR. BLAYLOCK: YOUR HONOR, FIRST OF ALL WITH 
17 REGARDS TO THREE AND EIGHT, I SUBMIT THAT THE EVIDENCE IS 
18 THAT THE LOCKS WERE CUT, THE DOORS WERE OPENED. AND THAT 
19 TESTIMONY WAS GIVEN BY WESLEY TAYLOR. AND I WOULD 
2 0 SUGGEST THAT THE EVIDENCE THAT THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN AN 
21 ENTRY IS THE EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS AN ENTRY IN THE 
22 OTHER UNITS. AND THE FACT THAT SOMETHING MAY NOT HAVE 
23 BEEN MISSING, THAT BASICALLY IS FOR THE JURY TO DECIDE, 
24 AND I WOULD SUGGEST THAT SINCE THERE IS EVIDENCE OF ENTRY 
25 TO THE OTHER UNITS, THAT WOULD BE CONSISTENT, THAT WOULD 
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1 ALSO BE CONSISTENT TO THE ENTRY OF THOSE UNITS. 
2 AGAIN, I SUGGEST IT'S A FACTUAL QUESTION FOR 
3 THE JURY TO DECIDE. THAT IS SOMETHING THAT COULD BE 
4 ARGUED, AND I WOULD SUGGEST THAT IT OUGHT TO AT LEAST GO 
5 TO THE JURY ON THAT ISSUE FOR THEIR DETERMINATION, 
6 BECAUSE THERE WAS CLEARLY EVIDENCE ON THE OTHER UNITS 
7 THAT THERE WAS SOME TYPE OF ENTRY, THAT THINGS HAD BEEN 
8 MOVED, AND THINGS WERE MISSING. THAT WAS VERY CLEARLY 
9 STATED. 
10 THE COURT: ANY FURTHER ARGUMENT? 
11 MR. ANDERSON: WELL, THERE WASN'T EVIDENCE ON 
12 ALL OF THE UNITS. 
13 I THINK, YOUR HONOR, I THINK WITH JUST THAT 
14 INFERENCE THE BURDEN IS ON THE STATE TO ESTABLISH THE 
15 ELEMENTS OF A CRIME, AND ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME 
16 IS ENTRY, MEANING AN INTRUSION INTO THE BUILDING. AND ON 
17 THESE COUNTS THAT I POINT OUT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE IN 
18 THE RECORD, ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE, THAT THERE WAS AN 
19 INTRUSION INTO THE BUILDING. 
20 THE COURT: WELL, I CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE TO BE 
21 EXTREMELY THIN. HOWEVER, THERE IS, IT SEEMS TO THE 
22 COURT, CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IN FACT, WITH RESPECT TO 
23 SEVERAL LOCKERS WHEN THERE HAS BEEN A BOLT CUT AND A DOOR 
24 LIFTED, THAT THAT HAS RESULTED IN AN ENTRY. IN SOME 
25 CASES THERE HAS BEEN SOME LOSS REPORTED, AND IN OTHERS 
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1 NOTHING MORE THAN THE FACT THAT THERE WAS A DISTURBANCE. 
2 AND I BELIEVE ON THAT BASIS, THAT FROM THIS, THE JURY 
3 COULD INFER THAT THERE HAD BEEN ENTRY INTO THE OTHERS. 
4 AND I THINK THAT THE— THEREFORE THE STATE HAS MET AT 
5 LEAST THE BURDEN OF SUBMITTING IT TO THE JURY, AND SO THE 
6 COURT IS WILLING TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE EVIDENCE IS VERY 
7 THIN, AND MAY RECONSIDER THE ISSUE ON POST TRIAL MOTIONS; 
8 BUT AT THIS POINT I'M SATISFIED THE STATE MET ITS BURDEN 
9 AND WILL SUBMIT IT TO THE JURY, AND I'M GOING TO DENY THE 
10 MOTION. 
11 ANYTHING ELSE? 
12 MR. YOUNGBERG: I DON'T BELIEVE SO, JUDGE. 
13 AT SOME POINT WE STILL HAVE TO PUT ON THE 
14 RECORD THE OBJECTION TO THE 29TH TESTIMONY, BUT IF YOU 
15 WANT TO PUSH AHEAD, I SUPPOSE WE CAN START CALLING OUR 
16 WITNESSES. 
17 THE COURT: I THINK WHAT I WANT TO DO IS I WANT 
18 TO GET THIS CASE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AS SOON AS WE CAN 
19 DO IT. AND AS SOON AS THAT'S DONE I WOULD INVITE COUNSEL 
20 TO PUT EVERYTHING ON THE RECORD. 
21 MR. YOUNGBERG: ALL RIGHT. 
22 MR. BLAYLOCK: JUDGE, SO THAT THERE ISN'T ANY 
23 QUESTION ABOUT THAT ON BEHALF OF THE STATE, WE WOULD 
24 STIPULATE THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN EARLIER IN THE TRIAL 
25 AND IT'S ONLY BECAUSE OF THE PRESS OF GETTING THIS THING 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MONDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1996; P.M. 
2 I P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 THE COURT: WE'LL GO ON RECORD IN THE STATE OF 
4 UTAH VERSUS JEFFERY SPRAGUE, 9951900792. 
5 THE RECORD SHOULD SHOW MR. SPRAGUE IS BEFORE 
6 THE COURT AND MR. YOUNGBERG BIS COUNSEL REPRESENTING 
7 BIM. 
8 THERE WAS A PRESENTENCE REPORT PREPARED. 
9 MR. YOUNGBERG, HAVE YOU HAD A CHANCE TO REVIEW THAT WITH 
10 YOUR CLIENT. 
11 MR. YOUNGBERG: WE HAVE, JUDGE. 
12 THE COURT: ARE YOU PREPARED TO GO FORWARD WITH 
13 SENTENCING AT THIS TIME. 
14 MR. YOUNGBERG: WE ARE. 
15 THE COURT: PLEASE PROCEED. 
16 MR. YOUNGBERG: I GUESS THE FIRST THING I 
17 SHOULD BRING UP, JUDGE, IS THAT AFTER THE TRIAL I FILED A 
18 MOTION, A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT ON FOUR 
19 COUNTS OUT OF THE THIRTEEN THIRD-DEGREE FELONIES. IF THE 
20 COURT RECALLS, IT WAS OUR POSITION THAT AS TO COUNTS ONE, 
21 THREE, SEVEN AND TEN, THERE HAD BEEN NO EVIDENCE 
22 PRESENTED THAT THOSE PARTICULAR STORAGE UNITS HAD EVER 
23 BEEN ENTERED. THERE WAS EVIDENCE PRESENTED THAT THE 
24 LOCKS HAD BEEN CUT OFF, BUT THERE WAS NOTHING MOVED 
25 INSIDE THOSE FOUR UNITS, NOR WAS ANYTHING TAKEN FROM 
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1 THOSE FOUR UNITS. 
2 THE COURT: I REMEMBER YOU RAISED THAT 
3 REPEATEDLY DURING THE TRIAL, SO THE COURT DID ADDRESS 
4 THAT. 
5 I MR. YOUNGBERG: OKAY. AND I BELIEVE THAT HAS 
6 NEVER BEEN RULED ON, BUT THE JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING— I 
7 KNOW THE STATE HAS FILED A MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION, AND 
8 I HAVE BEEN GIVEN A COPY OF THAT SOME TIME AGO, BUT I 
9 DON'T KNOW, FOR THE RECORD, IF THE COURT HAS EVER RULED 
10 ON THAT MOTION. 
11 THE COURT: IF NOT, THE COURT WILL DENY THE 
12 MOTION, BASED ON THE REASONS THE COURT STATED ON THE 
13 RECORD AT THE CRIMINAL TRIAL. IT FELT THAT WAS PROPERLY 
14 PRESENTED TO THE JURY AND THE JURY DECIDED ON THE 
15 EVIDENCE THAT WAS THERE. 
16 I MR. YOUNGBERG: SO WE'RE PREPARED TO GO 
17 FORWARD, JUDGE, ON SENTENCING. 
18 THE FIRST QUESTION WE WANT TO CLEAR UP IS THE 
19 REASON WE ASKED FOR THE CONTINUANCE OF TWO OR THREE 
20 WEEKS, IS THAT IN THE PRESENTENCE REPORT THEY INDICATED 
21 THAT MR. SPRAGUE BAD BEEN EXTRADITED BACK TO KANSAS. I 
2 2 WAS ABLE TO TRACK THAT SITUATION DOWN AND I CAN REPRESENT 
23 I TO THE COURT THAT MR. SPRAGUE WAS NOT EVER EXTRADITED 
24 BACK TO KANSAS. THERE WAS A WARRANT ISSUED BASED ON THE 
25 FINE THAT WAS NOT PAID IN KANSAS, SO BE WAS PICKED UP ON 
3 
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Q. WERE YOU NOTIFIED SOMETIME EARLIER THIS YEAR IN 
MARCH ABOUT A PROBLEM THAT HAD OCCURRED AT CENTRAL 
SELF-STORAGE? 
A. YES, I WAS. 
Q. WERE YOU NOTIFIED AS TO A PROBLEM THAT OCCURRED 
ON THE 29TH OF MARCH? 
A. THAT WAS THE FIRST TIME— NOT POSITIVE ABOUT 
THE DATE, BUT IT WAS WHEN IT WAS BROKEN INTO THE FIRST 
TIME. 
Q. THE FIRST TIME? 
A. UM-HUM. 
Q. HOW WERE YOU NOTIFIED? 
A. POLICE OFFICER CALLED OUR HOME, AND IT WAS 
ABOUT TWO IN THE MORNING, TWO OR THREE IN THE MORNING, 
AND SAID THAT OUR STORAGE UNIT HAD BEEN BROKEN INTO. 
AND SO MY HUSBAND AND MY SON AND I WENT DOWN 
TO THE STORAGE UNIT AT THAT TIME, AND THE POLICE OFFICER 
TOOK US OVER THERE, AND IT HAD BEEN BROKEN INTO. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: MAY I APPROACH, YOUR HONOR? 
THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
(EXHIBIT 8-S INTRODUCED 
FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 
Q. (BY MR. BLAYLOCK) LET ME SHOW YOU WHAT HAS 
BEEN MARKED AS STATE'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT S-8. CAN YOU 
IDENTIFY THAT? 
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1 A. YES. 
2 Q. WHAT IS THAT? 
3 A. THIS IS A PICTURE OF MY STORAGE UNIT. THIS WAS 
4 THE FIRST NIGHT THAT IT WAS BROKEN INTO. 
5 Q. DOES THAT FAIRLY REPRESENT TO YOU THE WAY IT 
6 APPEARED TO YOU AS YOU WERE THERE THAT MORNING? 
7 A. UM-HUM. THERE WERE BOXES THROWN AROUND. 
8 THINGS STILL SEEMED TO BE IN SOMEWHAT THE SAME PLACES 
9 THAT THEY WERE WHEN I PUT THEM IN. 
10 Q. NOW, HAD YOU PLACED A LOCK ON THAT LOCKER 
11 YOURSELF? 
12 A. YES. 
13 Q. WHAT HAPPENED TO THAT LOCK? 
14 A. IT WAS CUT OFF. 
15 Q. AFTER THE 29TH OF MARCH DID YOU THEN PLACE— 
16 WAS THERE ANOTHER LOCK PLACED ON YOUR LOCKER? 
17 A. THERE WAS ANOTHER LOCK PLACED ON THERE THAT 
18 NIGHT. MY HUSBAND AND I PLACED THE LOCK ON. 
19 Q. AND AGAIN WAS THIS ONE OF YOUR LOCKS? 
20 A. YES, IT WAS. 
21 Q. DID YOU— WERE YOU NOTIFIED AGAIN ABOUT A 
22 PROBLEM OCCURRING AT CENTRAL SELF-STORAGE? 
23 I A. I WAS. THE NEXT MORNING AT TWO OR THREE 
24 O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING MY UNIT HAD BEEN BROKEN INTO 
25 AGAIN, AND THIS TIME— CAN I TALK? I WAS VERY, VERY 
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1 ANGRY. THE FIRST NIGHT I WAS UPSET. THE SECOND NIGHT I 
2 WAS ANGRY. 
3 1 MR. BLAYLOCK: MAY I APPROACH AGAIN, YOUR 
4 HONOR? 
5 THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
6 Q. (BY MR. BLAYLOCK) WOULD YOU LOOK AT WHAT HAS 
7 BEEN MARKED 9-S, PROPOSED STATE'S EXHIBIT. CAN YOU 
8 IDENTIFY THAT? 
9 A. UM-HUM. IT'S MY STORAGE UNIT. 
10 Q. AND ON WHAT NIGHT WOULD THAT BE, OR MORNING? 
11 A. THE NEXT MORNING. IT WAS THE SECOND DAY. 
12 SECOND MORNING IT WAS BROKEN INTO. 
13 Q. THAT WOULD BE THE 30TH OF MARCH? 
14 A. IF THAT WAS THE DATE. 
15 Q. AND WHAT DID YOU FIND MISSING ON THE 30TH OF 
16 MARCH? 
17 A. I FOUND ALL OF MY SON AND DAUGHTER-IN-LAW'S 
18 BABY FURNITURE HAD BEEN STOLEN. THERE WAS THEIR CRADLE, 
19 NEW PLAYPEN, A HIGH CHAIR, A CAR SEAT. AND THEN THEY 
2 0 TOOK MY CRADLE. THAT WAS A BIG— A BIG WOODEN CRADLE 
21 THAT HAD BEEN HANDMADE, AND THEY TOOK THAT. THEY HAD TO 
22 GET INTO THE BACK OF MY STORAGE, AND THEY TOOK THAT OUT. 
23 AND I'M SORRY, BUT THAT UPSETS ME BECAUSE THAT 
24 WAS MINE AND THAT WAS FROM— 
25 MR. YOUNGBERG: I ASK THAT THE WITNESS PROCEED 
92 
00045? 
Addendum E 
ORIGINAL 
IN THE DISTRICT < 
IN AND FOR 
STATE OF UTAH, 
ZOURT OF THE THIRD J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
P L A I N T I F F , 
V . 
JACK CHRISTOPHER 
FBJD DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 
By—Si-
CRIMINAL 
JENNINGS, 
DEFENDANT, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P L A I N T I F F , 
V . 
JEFFREY SPRAGUE, 
DEFENDANT. 
BEFORE THE 
CRIMINAL NO. 
HONORABLE WILLIAM B . 
NOVEMBER 1 5 , 1 9 9 5 
REPORTER 
MORNING SESSION 
' S «2?AK9£MPT OF 1 
Utah Court of ADDeals 
JUL 2 5 1996 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
<H>o|ftc6* 
0 1 W6 
•P* tifo» 
NO. 9 5 1 9 0 0 7 9 1 
9 5 1 9 0 0 7 9 2 
BOHLING, JUDGE 
DN APPEAL 
10'Of ?"?*> 
Q. WHAT'S LOCATED THERE? 
A . THAT'S CENTRAL SELF-STORAGE. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: MAY I APPROACH, YOUR HONOR? 
THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
Q. (BY MR. BLAYLOCK) WOULD YOU LOOK AT EXHIBITS 
1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , AND 5 ; STATE'S EXHIBITS. 
CAN YOU IDENTIFY THAT? 
A . YES. THIS I S THE STORAGE FACILITY. OUR OFFICE 
I S ON THE EAST AND OUR APARTMENT I S RIGHT NEXT DOOR TO 
I T . 
Q. AND YOU AND YOUR HUSBAND ARE MANAGERS THERE? 
A . YES, WE ARE. 
Q. HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN MANAGERS OF THAT 
FACILITY? 
A. IT WILL BE SIX YEARS THIS COMING MAY. 
Q. WHICH SIDE OF THE ROAD I S THAT STORAGE FACILITY 
LOCATED ON? 
A . I T ' S ON THE WEST. WELL, DO YOU WANT RIGHT OR 
LEFT? I T ' S ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE ROAD. 
Q. I T ' S ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE ROAD? 
A . YES, UH-HUH. 
Q. WAS THERE A TIME EARLIER THIS YEAR WHEN THERE 
WAS A PROBLEM WITH LOCKS BEING CUT OFF STORAGE LOCKERS? 
A . YES, THERE WAS. 
Q. DO YOU RECALL WHEN THAT WAS? 
1 1 3 
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A. IT WAS IN MARCH OF THIS YEAR, THE 29TB AND 
30TH. 
Q. DID YOU MAKE NOTES OF WHEN THAT OCCURRED? 
A. YES. YES, WE DID. 
Q. WILL YOU REFER TO THOSE NOTES IN GIVING ME 
THOSE TWO DATES? 
A. YES, UH-HUH. 
Q. TELL ME THE PROCEDURE THAT YOU NORMALLY GO 
THROUGH AS FAR AS A DAY. IF SOMEBODY HAS A STORAGE UNIT 
WITH YOU, HOW DO THEY GAIN ACCESS TO THAT STORAGE UNIT? 
A. OUR HOURS ARE FROM 7 A.M. UNTIL 9:00 P.M. IN 
THE EVENING. AND WHEN OUR GATE IS OPEN, I'M IN THE 
OFFICE FROM 9 UNTIL 6. AND THE PROCEDURE IS THAT THE 
PEOPLE COME IN, SIGN IN ON A CLIPBOARD OUTSIDE MY OFFICE 
DOOR AND THEN PROCEED TO THEIR UNIT IN THE FACILITY. 
Q. NOW, DOES IT HAVE TO BE THE INDIVIDUAL WHO 
SPECIFICALLY RENTS FROM YOU? 
A. BASICALLY THAT WOULD BE VERY HARD TO POLICE AS 
INDIVIDUALS. THEY NEED TO HAVE A KEY, BUT WE DO 
SUPERVISE THE YARD. 
Q. DO YOU KNOW A JACK JENNINGS OR JEFFERY SPRAGUE? 
A. NO, I DON'T. 
Q. HAVE YOU SEARCHED YOUR RECORDS TO DETERMINE IF 
EITHER OF THOSE TWO INDIVIDUALS WAS RENTING A FACILITY AT 
CENTRAL SELF-STORAGE? 
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SELF-LIMITING IN A LOT OF AREAS. 
Q. THESE UNITS DO NOT HAVE LIGHTS IN THEM? 
A. NO, THEY DO NOT. 
Q. NOW, YOU INDICATED THAT THERE WAS A PROBLEM ON 
THE 29TH OF MARCH. WHEN DID THAT FIRST COME TO YOUR 
ATTENTION? 
A. WHEN WE WERE NOTIFIED— THE WEST JORDAN POLICE 
ACTUALLY NOTIFIED U S — THE GATE WAS OPEN. 
MR. YOUNGBERG: JUDGE, I'M SORRY. IF I COULD 
INTERRUPT. 
I WOULD OBJECT TO ANY MORE MENTION OF THE 
2 9TH. JUDGE, THAT'S NOT THE CHARGE IN THIS. THAT'S 
BASED ON OUR CONVERSATION YESTERDAY, BUT FOR THE RECORD I 
WOULD OBJECT TO HER GOING INTO THE EVENTS OF THE 2 9TH. 
THE COURT: OVERRULED. 
MR. ANDERSON: I BELIEVE, FOR THE RECORD, I 
THINK I SHOULD JOIN THAT. 
THE COURT: YOUR OBJECTION IS NOTED. THANK 
YOU, COUNSEL. 
Q. (BY MR. BLAYLOCK) WHAT WAS YOUR ACTION UPON 
RECEIVING NOTIFICATION FROM WEST JORDAN POLICE? 
A. WE GOT DRESSED— WE WERE ASLEEP IN THE 
APARTMENT AND WE IMMEDIATELY GOT DRESSED AND MET THE 
OFFICERS AT THE FRONT OF THE FACILITY. 
Q. DO* YOU RECALL ABOUT WHAT TIME THAT WAS? 
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1 A. WHEN I LOOKED AT THE CLOCK RIGHT OVER OUR BED, 
2 ON THE HEADBOARD, IT SAID 2:18 P.M. IT WAS P.M.— OR 
3 A.M. I BEG YOUR PARDON. 
4 Q. WHAT DID YOU DO PERSONALLY, THEN? 
5 A. I WENT INTO THE OFFICE. 
6 MY BUSBAND IS VERY CONCERNED OVER MY 
7 WELL-BEING, AND SO BE SAID YOU STAY RIGHT HERE. DON'T 
8 YOU GO. 
9 AND SO I WENT INTO THE OFFICE AND STAYED THERE, 
10 AND THEN THEY— I GUESS— WELL, HE AND THE OFFICERS TOOK 
11 CARE OF THE INSPECTION OF THE YARD. 
12 Q. NOW, DID YOU OBSERVE OR DID YOU HAVE ANY PEOPLE 
13 THAT CAME AND— 
14 A. YES. 
15 Q. —TO THEIR UNITS? 
16 A. YES. I WENT THROUGH AS THEY BROUGHT BACK THE 
17 NUMBERS, AS WES-- WESLEY IS MY HUSBAND. AS HE BROUGHT 
18 BACK THE NUMBERS OF THE UNITS, I TURNED ON MY COMPUTER 
L9 AND PULLED UP IN THE COMPUTER LISTING— YOU KNOW, THE 
>.0 INDIVIDUAL RENTAL SITUATION ON THE COMPUTER AND CALLED 
!1 THE INDIVIDUALS THAT WERE CONCERNED, THE ONES THAT HAD 
2 BEEN CUT AND BROKEN INTO. 
3 Q. WHY DID YOU DO THAT AT 2 O'CLOCK IN THE 
4 MORNING? 
5 A. I FELT IF IT WAS ME I WOULD HAVE WANTED TO 
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KNOW. AND IT 
Q. AND 
ON? 
A. MAY 
Q. YES 
'S JUST-- I JUST FELT IT WAS GOOD BUSINESS. 
WHAT UNITS WERE THE UNITS THAT YOU CALLED 
I? 
, IF YOU WOULD. 
A. I CALLED— TRIED TO GET, JOVONA— DO YOU WANT 
NAMES OR JUST 
MR. 
NUMBERS? 
YOUNGBERG: JUDGE, I'M SORRY TO INTERRUPT 
AGAIN. I'M GOING TO OBJECT TO THIS ON RELEVANCE 
GROUNDS. 
ARE 
THE 
30TH. 
MR. 
THE 
THESE ARE THE 
SEE THEM, THE 
Q. (BY 
WE TALKING ABOUT THE 29TH? 
WITNESS: NO. WE'RE TALKING ABOUT THE 
YOUNGBERG: OKAY. SORRY. 
WITNESS: I DO EVERYTHING THE SAME TODAY. 
UNITS OF THE 30TH. IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO 
DATE IS HERE IN THE COMPUTER. 
MR. BLAYLOCK) IF WE COULD TAKE ONE STEP 
BACK. I WANTED TO ASK YOU ABOUT WHAT UNITS ON THE 2 9TH 
WERE CALLED. 
DID 
A. YES, 
Q. CAN 
MR. 
JUDGE, TO THE 
YOU CALL ABOUT THE UNITS ON THE 29TH? 
, UB-HUH. 
YOU TELL ME WHAT UNITS THOSE WERE? 
YOUNGBERG: OF COURSE THIS IS MY OBJECTION, 
RELEVANCE OF THAT. THESE ARE NOT CHARGED 
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IN THIS CASE, AND I DON'T SEE THAT THEY'RE RELEVANT, 
UNITS THAT WERE CALLED ON THE 2 9TH. 
THE COURT: DO YOU WANT TO RESPOND, 
MR. BLAYLOCK? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: EXCUSE ME? 
THE COURT: AS TO THE OBJECTION AS TO RELEVANCE 
AS TO WHY YOU NEED IDENTIFICATION OF THE UNITS. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: IT'S OUR ALLEGATION THAT ONE OF 
THESE UNITS WAS HIT BOTH NIGHTS. I WANT A LIST OF THE 
UNITS THAT WERE HIT, WHERE THEIR APPROXIMATE LOCATION 
WAS. 
THE COURT: LOCATION WOULD MAKE IT RELEVANT. 
OVERRULED. 
THE WITNESS: DO YOU WANT THOSE NUMBERS? 
Q. (BY MR. BLAYLOCK) WE'RE TALKING ABOUT THE 
29TH? 
A. 29TH. 461, 659 — 
Q. AS WE GO ALONG, YOU HAVE LISTED THE RENTER OF 
THAT PARTICULAR UNIT; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND 461 THE RENTER WAS? 
A. DOUG PARKIN. 
MR. YOUNGBERG: JUDGE, I THINK WE CAN STIPULATE 
THAT UNIT 711 WAS HIT ON BOTH NIGHTS, IF THAT WILL HELP. 
THAT WOULD BE THE ONLY UNIT. 
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THE WITNESS: THAT'S CORRECT. 
DO YOU WANT TO GO BACK HERE? 
Q. (BY MR. BLAYLOCK) YES. 
A. I BEG YOUR PARDON. 
652, FRED LUCERO; 464, ALVIN DAVENPORT; 462 IS 
ALFRED MEDINA, 463 WAS SHIRLEY PANTING. 653 IS DATA 
SERVICE, ROBERT RICE. 
Q. 653? 
A. YES, UB-HUH. 710, MICHAEL GALLAGOS AND 711 WAS 
CINDY BEARD. 
Q. MARILYN, WILL YOU STEP DOWN HERE TO STATE'S 
EXHIBIT NUMBER ONE. 
NOW, WOULD YOU SHOW— CAN YOU SHOW US WHERE 
THOSE UNITS ARE? 
A. THEY'RE ALL APPROXIMATELY IN THIS AREA. THIS 
IS 711. THIS IS 652, 653, 651. THEY'RE ALL IN THIS 
AREA, WHICH IS THE FURTHEST AREA FROM THE OFFICE AND THE 
APARTMENT. IT'S IN THIS CORNER. 
Q. WOULD YOU JUST TAKE THIS PEN AND WRITE BY THOSE 
UNITS 3/29 RIGHT BY EACH OF THOSE UNITS. 
A. (COMPLIES.) 
Q. ARE YOU OKAY THERE? 
A. I'M FINE. 
Q. THANK YOU. DO YOU KNOW A CINDY BEARD WHO CAME 
OUT THAT NIGHT? 
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1 A. YES. WELL, YES, SHE DID. CINDY CAME. IT WAS 
2 VERY RAPIDLY. SHE BROUGHT ANOTHER LOCK TO PUT ON HER 
3 UNIT AND LOCKED IT AGAIN. 
4 Q. DID YOU EVER GO OUT AND LOOK AT THIS UNIT? 
5 A. NOT MYSELF, NO. 
6 Q. NOT YOURSELF? 
7 A. WESLEY DID. 
8 Q. THEN THERE WAS A PROBLEM THE NEXT NIGHT? 
9 A. YES, UH-HUH. 
10 Q. NOW, IS THERE SOMEONE THAT CHECKS ALL THE 
11 LOCKERS DURING THE DAY? 
12 A. YES. BOTH MY HUSBAND AND I DO. I GO AROUND 
13 1 1 — BETWEEN 11:00 AND 12:30. I TRY NOT TO MAKE IT THE 
14 SAME TIME BECAUSE IT'S EASILY OBSERVED, BECAUSE I DRIVE 
15 THE GOLF CART, BECAUSE, YOU CAN SEE I'M, NOT TOO GOOD A 
16 WALKER. AND THEN BE GOES AGAIN BETWEEN 3:00 AND 3:30. 
17 Q. NOW, DID ALL OF THOSE INDIVIDUALS RESPOND? 
18 A. NOT ALL. NOT ALL. SOME OF THEM— WELL, 
19 MICHAEL GALLEGOS, THERE WAS NO ANSWER. ALFRED MEDINA, I 
20 GOT A HOLD OF HIS MOTHER AND SHE AND HE CAME. THEY DID 
11 RESPOND, BUT NOT AT THAT MOMENT. 
!2 I Q. NOT IMMEDIATELY? 
3 A. NOT IMMEDIATELY. 
4 I Q. IF THEY DIDN'T COME THAT NIGHT, WHAT ACTION DID 
5 YOU TAKE? 
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1 A. WELL, BASICALLY WHAT WE DID WAS-- A GOODLY 
2 PORTION OF THEM CAME THE FOLLOWING DAY. THERE'S VICKI, 
3 VICKI GOFF, CAME THE FOLLOWING DAY BECAUSE SHE DIDN'T 
4 HAVE TRANSPORTATION THAT NIGHT. 
5 Q. YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT THE 30TH, RIGHT? 
6 A. NO, NO. I BEG YOUR PARDON. LET'S BACK UP. 
7 WHERE ARE WE THEN? 
8 Q. OKAY. I'M JUST SAYING FOR THE 29TH, IF 
9 SOMEBODY DIDN'T COME OUT THAT NIGHT, WHAT DID YOU DO? 
10 MR. YOUNGBERG: JUDGE, MAY I OBJECT AGAIN? I'M 
11 SORRY TO HAVE TO CONTINUE TO OBJECT TO THIS. 
12 HOW DO INDIVIDUALS THAT WERE BURGLED ON THE 
13 2 9TH, COMING OUT AND LOOKING AT THE PROPERTY, THE 
14 LOCATION-- AGAIN, I OBJECT ON RELEVANCE. I WON'T OBJECT 
15 AGAIN, BUT I WOULD LIKE A CONTINUING OBJECTION TO 
16 ANYTHING ON THE 29TH, BASED ON RELEVANCE. WE ESTABLISHED 
17 LOCATION, AND THAT'S MY OBJECTION. 
18 THE COURT: MR. BLAYLOCK? 
19 MR. BLAYLOCK: YOUR HONOR, THE QUESTION I WAS 
20 GOING TO ASK IS WHETHER OR NOT THEY PLACED LOCKS ON THOSE 
21 UNITS THAT WERE LEFT OPEN. I'M NOT GOING TO ASK ANY MORE 
22 QUESTIONS. 
23 THE COURT: PROCEED. 
24 THE WITNESS: YES. 
25 Q. (BY. MR. BLAYLOCK) DID YOU PLACE LOCKS ON THOSE 
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1 LOCKERS WHEN PEOPLE DIDN'T RESPOND? 
2 A. YEP. 
3 Q. I HADN'T ASKED YOU THAT? 
4 I A. THAT'S OKAY. 
5 Q. SO ON THE 29TH, DURING THE DAY, YOU DROVE 
6 AROUND THE STORAGE UNITS? 
7 A. UM-HUM. 
8 I Q. AND WHAT WERE YOU DOING AS YOU WERE DRIVING 
9 AROUND? 
10 A. WELL, I GO DOWN-- USUALLY GO ON THE FAR AISLE. 
11 THAT'S THE 600 AISLE. 
12 Q. YOU CAN STEP UP THERE IF THAT HELPS YOU. 
13 A. OKAY. USUALLY I JUST CAME DOWN, YES. 
14 I Q. I HAVE A POINTER HERE, IF THAT MAKES IT 
15 EASIER. 
16 A. THE WAY WE DO THESE, SOMETIMES PEOPLE GO 
17 WITHOUT PAYING THE RENT, SO THIS IS SOMETHING WE HAVE 
18 ALWAYS DONE. BUT I DRIVE DOWN THE AISLE AND YOU CAN SEE 
19 THE LOCKS ON THE DOOR. ANYTHING THAT HAS A DOUBLE LOCK 
20 ON IT I TAKE THE NUMBER DOWN, BECAUSE IT'S POSSIBLE WE 
21 HAVE LEFT AN OVER-LOCK ON IT. AND THEN WE COME DOWN IN 
22 THE CORNER AND CHECK, COME BACK UP THIS AISLE THE SAME 
23 WAY, GOING THE OTHER DIRECTION, CHECK THE ENDS. AND 
24 CHECK AS WE GO, COME CLEAR OUT AND DOWN THIS WAY, AND 
25 THIS WAY, JUST FOLLOWING A PATTERN. AND OF COURSE 
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THESE— AS WE COME TO THE END OF THE AISLE AND THEN UP 
HERE, TOO 
ARE. 
IN AND 
, THESE ARE KIND OF COVERED AISLES, IS WHAT THEY 
YOU HAVE TO GET OFF THE GOLF CART HERE AND WALK 
CHECK AS YOU GO IN TO MAKE SURE, AND THESE ON THE 
EDGE HERE 
ONES HERE 
CART. 
Q. 
ARE OPEN. BUT YOU HAVE TO GO INTO THESE LITTLE 
AND JUST KIND OF BACK UP, DRIVING MY GOLF 
AND GO BACK INTO MY OFFICE. 
SO USING THAT PROCEDURE, WHAT DID YOU 
PERSONALLY FIND? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
BEEN. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
POINT? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
ON THE— DURING THE DAYTIME? 
YEAH. 
ON THE 29TH? 
YES. 
2 9TH, EVERYTHING WAS LOCKED UP THAT SHOULD HAVE 
YOU FOUND NO LOCKS CUT OFF? 
NO, NONE AT ALL. 
AND WERE ANY OF THOSE UNITS OVER-LOCKED AT THAT 
ONE. 
WHICH ONE WAS THAT? 
JOVONA O'CONNOR, 308 OR 309. 
DO YOU NEED TO REFER TO THESE SPECIFICALLY? 
SORRY. I HATE TO ADMIT MY AGE TO PEOPLE, BUT 
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Q. 
A. 
Q. 
JORDAN? 
AND WHO WAS THAT WITH? 
WEST VALLEY CITY. 
DO YOU HAVE ANY SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS WITH WEST 
OR DID YOU ON THE 30TH OF JUNE— MARCH 29TH AND 
30TH OF MARCH? 
A. 
Q. 
I WAS ON PATROL. 
WITH YOUR SENIORITY YOU PROBABLY HAD THE LATE 
SHIFT; IS THAT THE WAY IT WORKS? 
A. 
Q. 
FAMILIAR 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
STATION? 
A. 
YES. I WAS IN TRAINING. 
LET'S TALK ABOUT THE 29TH OF MARCH. ARE YOU 
WITH THE CENTRAL SELF-STORAGE UNIT THERE? 
YES. 
WHERE IS THAT? 
7210 SOUTH STATE— OR SOUTH REDWOOD ROAD. 
WHERE IS THAT IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE POLICE 
THE POLICE STATION IS 8000 SOUTH REDWOOD ROAD. 
IT'S ABOUT EIGHT BLOCKS. 
Q. 
THE 29TH 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
THE GATE 
DID YOU NOTICE ANYTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY ON 
OF MARCH IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS? 
YES, I DID. 
WHAT WAS THAT? 
I NOTICED A GATE WAS OPEN ON THE STORAGE UNIT. 
WAS USUALLY CLOSED AND LOCKED. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: MAY I APPROACH, YOUR HONOR? 
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1 THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
2 Q. (BY MR. BLAYLOCK) WOULD YOU LOOK AT EXHIBITS 
3 2, 3, 4 AND 5. DO THESE FAIRLY DEPICT CENTRAL 
4 SELF-STORAGE UNIT? 
5 A. YEAH, STORAGE UNIT, THAT I SEEN THAT NIGHT. 
6 Q. WHAT DID YOU DO WHEN YOU FOUND THE GATE OPEN? 
7 A. WHICH NIGHT IS THIS? 
8 Q. THE 29TH. 
9 A. THE 29TH? 
10 Q. YEAH. THE FIRST NIGHT. 
11 A. FIRST NIGHT? 
12 Q. YEAH. 
13 A. OKAY. I DROVE PAST. I WAS NORTHBOUND. I 
14 LOOKED OVER AND NOTICED THE GATE OPEN. I THOUGHT IT WAS 
15 PECULIAR, SO I TURNED AROUND AND I DROVE BACK INTO THE 
16 PARKING LOT, LOOKED AT IT, SLOWED DOWN, HAD A FLOOD THERE 
17 AND DROVE UP TO THE GATE. 
18 AT THAT TIME I COULD SEE THAT THE GATES WERE 
19 OPEN. AND THERE WAS A CHAIN LAYING THERE ON THE GROUND 
2 0 SO I COULD TELL AT THAT TIME THAT THE LOCK HAD BEEN CUT 
21 OFF AND SOMEONE HAD BEEN IN THERE. 
22 Q. DID YOU HAVE CONTACT WITH THE MANAGERS OF THE 
23 FACILITY? 
24 A. AFTER THAT. WE DROVE THROUGH THE COMPLEX TO 
25 SEE WHETHER THERE WAS ANYBODY STILL INSIDE AND WE NOTICED 
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SOME OF THE STORAGE UNITS IN THE BACK HAD BEEN CUT OFF— 
THE LOCKS HAD BEEN CUT OFF. THE DOORS WERE OPEN A LITTLE 
BIT. SOME WERE OPEN ALL THE WAY. SOME WERE SLIGHTLY 
OPEN. WE WENT AND CONTACTED THE MANAGERS AFTER THAT WHEN 
WE DETERMINED THERE WAS NOBODY INSIDE STILL. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: MAY I APPROACH AGAIN, YOUR 
HONOR? 
THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
Q. (BY MR. BLAYLOCK) WOULD YOU LOOK AT STATE'S 
EXHIBIT 8-S. IS THAT ONE OF THE STORAGE UNITS YOU SAW ON 
THE 29TH THAT WAS OPEN? 
A. YEAH. I REMEMBER THAT ONE. STUFF WAS SLIGHTLY 
TAKEN OUT OF THAT ONE. 
Q. DOES THAT APPEAR AS YOU SAW IT ON THE 29TH? 
A. YEAH. 
Q. LET'S GO NOW TO THE 30TH OF MARCH. WHAT 
HAPPENED ON THE 30TH OF MARCH IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS? 
A. THE 30TH OF MARCH, THAT'S WHAT PRETTY MUCH 
APPEARS THE NIGHT BEFORE, JUST ON PATROL. I DROVE BY 
AGAIN IN THE SAME DIRECTION AND LOOKED OVER AT THE GATE 
AND NOTICED THE GATE WAS OPEN AGAIN. THIS TIME THE GATE 
WAS ALL THE WAY OPEN, AND I TURNED TO THE OTHER OFFICER 
AND SAID, OH, THE GATE IS OPEN AGAIN. SO WE TURNED 
AROUND AND WENT BACK IN. 
Q. NOW, YOU SAY THE OTHER OFFICER. WHO WAS WITH 
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1 YOU? 
2 A. I WAS WITH OFFICER SCOTT RICKS BOTH NIGHTS. 
3 Q. WHAT DID YOU FIND? 
4 A. I FOUND THAT THE GATE HAD BEEN OPENED, THE LOCK 
5 HAD BEEN CUT OFF OF IT AGAIN. AND WHEN WE GOT THERE I 
6 GOT OUT OF THE VEHICLE, AT THE GATE, AND STAYED THERE 
7 WHILE OFFICER RICKS DROVE THROUGH THE COMPLEX. AND I 
8 KNOCKED ON THE DOOR TO LET THE MANAGERS KNOW. WHILE WE 
9 WERE WAITING FOR THEM TO COME OUT, I WAS DRIVING AROUND 
10 TO THE REAR BECAUSE IT IS QUITE A LONG DRIVE TO THE BACK. 
11 Q. OFFICER BENZON, WILL YOU STEP UP HERE TO 
12 STATE'S EXHIBIT NUMBER 1. YOU CAN STEP DOWN HERE. MAYBE 
13 THAT WOULD BE EASIER. 
14 DOES THAT FAIRLY REPRESENT CENTRAL 
15 SELF-STORAGE? 
16 A. YES. THAT'S A REAL GOOD REPRESENTATION. 
17 Q. WHERE IS REDWOOD ROAD FROM THERE? 
18 A. REDWOOD ROAD IS RIGHT HERE. 
19 Q. NOW, YOU SAY THAT YOU GOT OUT OF THE VEHICLE 
20 AND STOOD WHERE? 
21 A. WE PULLED IN TO HERE. THE GATE IS RIGHT HERE 
22 ALONG— OR THE GATE COMES THROUGH, THROUGH THERE. I 
2 3 STOOD HERE AND KNOCKED ON THE MANAGERS' DOOR. 
24 SCOTT, OFFICER RICKS, DROVE THROUGH THE BACK 
25 HERE. I WALKED DOWN HERE TO SEE IF I COULD FIND 
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1 A. YES. 
2 Q. WHO DID YOU HAVE WITH YOU? 
3 A. OFFICE BENZON. 
4 1 Q. ON THE 29TH— ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE CENTRAL 
5 SELF-STORAGE AREA? 
6 A. YES, I AM. 
7 Q. WHERE IS THAT LOCATED? 
8 A. APPROXIMATELY 7200 SOUTH AND REDWOOD ROAD. 
9 Q. DID YOU HAVE SOMETHING THAT CAUGHT YOUR 
10 ATTENTION THERE ON THE 29TH OF MARCH? 
11 A. YES, I DID. 
12 Q. WHAT WAS IT? 
13 A. WE WERE DRIVING SOUTHBOUND ON REDWOOD ROAD AND 
14 WE NOTICED AN OPEN GATE AT THE FACILITY. AND THE THING 
15 THAT BROUGHT IT TO OUR ATTENTION WAS THAT WE HAD A 
16 SIMILAR INCIDENT THE NIGHT BEFORE. SO WE DROVE IN TO 
17 INVESTIGATE THE OPEN GATE. 
18 Q. SO ARE WE TALKING ABOUT THE 30TH? 
19 A. YES. 
20 Q. OKAY. TELL ME ABOUT THE 29TH. 
21 A. I'M SORRY— THE 29TH. SAME AREA. WE WERE 
22 PATROLLING THE SAME AREA AND WE OBSERVED AN OPEN GATE. 
23 AND THE REASON THAT WAS BROUGHT TO OUR ATTENTION ON THE 
24 29TH IS THIS GATE IS USUALLY NOT OPEN. AND WHEN WE 
25 DISCOVERED THIS, WE NOTICED A LOCK LYING ON THE GROUND 
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1 WHERE THE TWO GATES COME TOGETHER. 
2 WE THEN PROCEEDED TO GO IN AND DISCOVERED THAT 
3 SEVERAL STORAGE FACILITIES ALSO HAD THEIR LOCKS CUT OFF 
4 TOWARDS THE REAR OF THE FACILITY AND THE DOORS TO THE 
5 STORAGE FACILITY WERE OPEN. 
6 Q. SO THAT HAPPENED ON THE 29TH? 
7 A. YES. 
8 1 Q. DO YOU RECALL WHAT AREA THESE CUT LOCKS WERE IN 
9 THAT STORAGE FACILITY? 
10 A. I BELIEVE THEY WERE MOSTLY TOWARDS THE BACK, 
11 PROBABLY THE SOUTHWEST— KIND OF A CORNER OF THE FACILITY 
12 WHERE MOST OF THEM ARE. 
13 Q. NOW, TELL ME ABOUT THE 30TH OF MARCH. 
14 A. ON THE 30TH OF MARCH, AGAIN AT APPROXIMATELY 2 
15 O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING, WE WERE AGAIN PATROLLING THE AREA 
16 AND AGAIN OBSERVED AN OPEN GATE. AND BECAUSE OF THE 
17 NIGHT BEFORE, WE PULLED IN TO INVESTIGATE AGAIN AND FOUND 
18 A CUT LOCK LYING BASICALLY IN THE SAME AREA. 
19 Q. WHERE WAS THAT? 
20 A. RIGHT WHERE THE TWO GATES COME TOGETHER— THE 
21 LOCK WAS LAYING SOMEWHERE IN TEAT AREA. 
22 Q. OFFICERS RICKS, IF YOU WOULD STEP DOWN AND 
23 WOULD YOU LOOK AT THIS DIAGRAM. SAYS CENTRAL 
24 SELF-STORAGE, STATE'S EXHIBIT NUMBER 1. 
25 A. YES. 
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O'OW? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND YOU TOGETHER, WHAT IS YOUR OCCUPATION? 
A. WE MANAGE CENTRAL SELF-STORAGE, WEST JORDAN. 
Q. BOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN THE MANAGERS OF THE 
CENTRAL SELF-STORAGE? 
A. IT'S ABOUT FIVE AND A HALF YEARS NOW. IT'S 
OVER FIVE AND A HALF. 
Q. DID YOU HAVE A PROBLEM THERE LATE MARCH 2 9TH 
AND 30TH OF THIS YEAR? 
A. WE SURE DID. 
Q. WHAT WAS THE PROBLEM?. 
A. WELL, WE WERE AWAKENED ABOUT 2 A.M. BY WEST 
JORDAN POLICE OFFICERS, AND OUR GATE LOCK HAD BEEN CUT 
AND SEVERAL UNITS HAD BEEN OPENED. AND SO WE GOT UP AND 
DID WHAT WE COULD. 
Q. DID THAT OCCUR BOTH NIGHTS? 
A. YES. 
Q. NOW, DIRECTING YOUR ATTENTION TO THE 30TH OF 
MARCH, TELL ME WHAT HAPPENED THEN. WHEN DID YOU FIRST 
UNDERSTAND THAT THERE MIGHT BE A PROBLEM? 
A. WELL, WE WERE ASLEEP AND THE KNOCK CAME ON THE 
DOOR. IT WAS ONE OF THE OFFICERS AND WE WERE KIND OF--
FROM THE NIGHT BEFORE WE WERE A LOT MORE PREPARED AND WE 
WERE ABLE TO GET RIGHT OUT THERE AND START TO WORK WITH 
THEM TO FIND OUT WHAT UNITS HAD BEEN CUT AND, YOU KNOW, 
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1 WHAT HAPPENED. 
2 Q. DID THIS HAPPEN BEFORE THEN? 
3 A. WE HAD NEVER HAD A PROBLEM IN ALL THE TIME WE 
4 HAD BEEN THERE UP UNTIL THE 29TH OF MARCH AND THE 30TH OF 
5 MARCH. 
6 Q. NOW, ON THE DAY OF THE 29TH, BEFORE THE MORNING 
7 OF THE 30TH, DID ANYBODY CHECK— WHY DON'T YOU STEP DOWN, 
8 WESLEY, AND TAKE A LOOK AT DIAGRAM S-l. 
9 DOES THAT REPRESENT CENTRAL SELF-STORAGE AS IT 
10 SITS? 
11 A. THAT'S THE MAP WE KEEP IN THE OFFICE TO SHOW 
12 PEOPLE WHERE TO FIND UNITS. 
13 Q. DID YOU IN FACT PROVIDE US WITH THAT MAP? 
14 A. YES. 
15 Q. WHICH DIRECTION IS NORTH ON THAT MAP? 
16 A. NORTH IS RIGHT OUT HERE. 
17 Q. THAT WOULD BE TO THE LEFT? 
18 A. YEAH. 
19 Q. AND REDWOOD ROAD WOULD BE AT THE TOP OF THE 
2 0 MAP ? 
21 A. YEAH. RIGHT HERE. 
22 Q. DID YOU OR ANYBODY ELSE ON THE DAY OF THE— 
2 3 AFTER THE PROBLEMS ON THE 2 9TH IN THE EARLY MORNING, 
24 CHECK THESE LOCKERS AND MAKE SURE THAT THERE WERE LOCKS 
25 ON ALL THE LOCKERS? 
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1 A. WELL, EVERY MORNING ABOUT 7 O'CLOCK, A LITTLE 
2 AFTER, I GO OUT AND I WALK. I COME RIGHT ACROSS HERE AND 
3 CHECK ALL THE LOCKS. I GO DOWN HERE, GOING BACK UP THIS 
4 SIDE AND JUST CHECK EVERY LOCK, AND TAKE A LIST AND EVERY 
5 UNIT THAT'S UNLOCKED, UNLESS I KNOW THAT IT'S OPEN AND 
6 WHAT WAS IN THERE THE NIGHT BEFORE, I OPEN IT TO SEE WHAT 
7 THE SITUATION IS. 
8 Q. DID YOU DO THAT THEN ON THE 29TH? 
9 1 A. ON THE MORNING OF THE 30TH. 
10 Q. WHAT DID YOU FIND? AGAIN WE'RE TALKING ABOUT 
11 THE MORNING OF THE 29TH AND THEN THE SECOND BREAK-IN WAS 
12 THE MORNING OF THE 30TH; IS THAT CORRECT? 
13 A. YEAH. 
14 Q. DID YOU FIND THAT THERE WERE ANY LOCKS MISSING 
15 ON ANY OF THOSE LOCKERS AT THAT TIME? 
16 A. NO. NO EVERYTHING WAS LOCKED THAT WAS SUPPOSED 
17 TO BE LOCKED EXCEPT IN THE— AT NIGHT WHEN I WENT OUT 
18 WITH THE OFFICERS. 
19 Q. SO ABOUT TWO O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING— HOW MANY 
20 TIMES DID YOU CHECK THOSE LOCKERS? 
21 A. OH, I DO IT AT VARIOUS TIMES, EXCEPT THE ONE 
22 TIME AT SEVEN IN THE MORNING, I MIGBT GO THROUGH TWO OR 
23 THREE TIMES A DAY. THE WIFE MIGHT GO THROUGH AND LOOK. 
24 WE JUST TRY TO KEEP THINGS OFF GUARD AND WATCH WHAT WE'RE 
25 DOING. 
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1 Q. DO YOU RECALL HOW MANY TIMES YOU WENT THROUGH 
2 ON THAT DAY BEFORE THE SECOND BURGLARY? 
3 A. I COULDN'T SAY EXACTLY. 
4 I Q. AND WHY DON'T YOU GO AHEAD AND HAVE A SEAT 
5 THERE FOR A MINUTE. 
6 WHAT IS YOUR PROCEDURE AS FAR AS LOCKING THE 
7 FACILITY? WHEN IS THE FACILITY OPENED? 
8 A. THE GATE— IT'S ADVERTISED IT WAS— THERE WAS A 
9 SIGN UP AT THE TIME. I'M IN THE PROCESS OF PUTTING A NEW 
10 SIGN FOR OUR NEW GATE. BUT THE SIGN SAYS "GATE OPENS 7 
11 A.M. AND CLOSES AT 9 P.M." 
12 IT'S ON OUR CARDS. THAT'S OUR PRACTICE. 
13 Q. IS ANYONE AUTHORIZED OTHER THAN YOU TO BE IN 
14 THERE AFTER 9:00 P.M.? 
15 A. NO. 
16 Q. IS ANYONE, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, AUTHORIZED 
17 TO BE IN THERE AT 2 O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING OR BEFORE 2 
18 O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING? 
19 A. NO. 
20 Q. WHAT DID YOU FIND AS YOU AROSE ON THE MORNING 
21 OF THE 30TH ABOUT 2 O'CLOCK? 
22 A. WE FOUND SEVERAL— WHEN I WENT OUT WITH THE 
23 OFFICERS WE WENT DOWN INTO THE AREA WHERE THE BREAK-INS 
24 WERE AND WE CHECKED EACH AND EVERY LOCK. AND THEN AT 
25 THAT TIME I AGAIN GOT ON THE CART, WITH A FLASHLIGHT, AND 
O0'0f>s 
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1 DOOR WAS WIDE OPEN ON THAT ONE. 
2 Q. 706. 
3 A. YES. THE DOOR WAS OPEN. THE LOCK WAS CUT. 
4 Q. 707? 
5 A. YES, THE SAME THING. 
6 Q. 708? 
7 A. 708 WAS THERE TOO, THAT'S RIGHT. 
8 Q. 711? 
9 A. AND 711. 
10 Q. AS A MATTER OF FACT THERE HAD BEEN A PROBLEM 
11 WITH 711 THE NIGHT BEFORE ALSO? 
12 A. THE NIGHT BEFORE, YES. I WAS DOWN WITH CINDY 
13 AND HER HUSBAND AND WE OPENED EVERYTHING UP AND LOOKED IN 
14 AND THEN WHEN WE OPENED IT THE NEXT NIGHT, RAISED THE 
15 DOOR UP ALL THE WAY WE COULD SEE THAT THERE WAS THINGS 
16 THAT WERE MISSING FROM THE NIGHT BEFORE. 
17 Q. YOU PERSONALLY OBSERVED THAT? 
18 A. YES. SHE WAS POINTING THAT OUT AND I COULD 
19 REMEMBER STUFF THAT WAS IN THERE, YOU KNOW. I COULDN'T 
20 TELL YOU WHAT IT WAS BECAUSE THEY KIND OF HAD IT COVERED, 
21 BUT, YEAH, I SAW THIS, IT WAS STUFF MISSING. 
22 Q. DIRECTING YOUR ATTENTION TO PICTURES, 8-S AND 
23 9-S, WHICH OF THOSE WOULD BE ON THE 29TB AND WHICH OF 
24 THOSE WOULD BE ON THE 30TH? 
25 A. IF I REMEMBER RIGHT, THE BLANKET HERE WAS — 
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1 THIS WAS DOWN ON THE 29TH. SO THAT WOULD BE 9-S WAS ON 
2 THE 29TH AND THE OTHER ONE IS ON THE 30TH. 
3 Q. IS THERE A DIFFERENCE IN ITEMS MISSING FROM 
4 THAT ONE? 
5 A. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THE BLANKET WAS THERE— 
6 NO. THAT'S RIGHT. 
7 Q. DOES 8 SHOW PROPERTY THAT'S NOT THERE? 
8 A. THAT'S RIGHT. AND THE BLANKET WAS OVER THERE 
9 THAT NIGHT. 
10 Q. 29TH? 
11 A. YES. I REMEMBER— THIS IS THE WAY IT LOOKED 
12 THE FIRST NIGHT. 
13 Q. AND THAT'S 8-S? 
14 A. THAT'S 8-S, YES. THAT'S RIGHT. 
15 Q. NOW, WERE ANY OF THOSE UNITS OVER-LOCKED? 
16 A. 309 IS THE ONLY UNIT THAT WAS OVER-LOCKED. 
17 Q. AND WHOSE WAS THAT? 
18 A. THAT WAS JOVONA O'CONNOR. 
19 Q. WHEN IT'S OVER-LOCKED WHO HAS A RIGHT TO THE 
20 PROPERTY IN THE UNIT? 
21 A. THE COMPANY AND THE MANAGER. 
22 I HAD A LOCK ON IT. SHE WAS BEING— I DON'T 
2 3 KNOW WHEN THE AUCTION WOULD HAVE BEEN, BUT WE WERE 
24 PREPARING FOR AN AUCTION. 
25 MR. BLAYLOCK: MAY I APPROACH, YOUR HONOR? 
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WITH? 
COUNSEL 
OKAY. COUNSEL, 
MR. ANDERSON: 
, ANYTHING THAT WE NEED TO 
YOUR HONOR, YOU SUGGESTED 
COME BACK 10 MINUTES EARLY. WE WOULD LIKE 
ON THE RECORD 
SCOPE OF 
OFF-THE-
OCCURRED 
THAT ON 
PLEASURE 
THAT. 
YOU HERE 
YOUR 
THAT THE DISCUSSION WE HAD REGARDING 
RULING THIS MORNING— REMEMBER THE 
RECORD DISCUSSION ABOUT THE BURGLARY THAT 
ON MARCH 29TH— 
THE RECORD. 
MR. 
WITH 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
AT 2! 
BLAYLOCK: 
REGARDS TO 
DEAL 
THAT 
TO PUT 
THE 
WE THINK WE REALLY NEED TO GET 
YOUR HONOR, WHAT IS THE COURT'S 
WHEN WE START TOMORROW? 
COURT: LET'S SHOOT FOR 9:30. 
BLAYLOCK: 
COURT: WE 
BLAYLOCK: 
AT 9:30? 
HAVE A TRO IN THE MORNING 
OKAY. 
BEFORE 
COURT: OKAY. WE'LL BE IN RECESS. I WANT 
t20. LET'S GET GOING AT 2:20. 
(LUNCH RECESS TAKEN.) 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1995; P.M. 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
(THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HELD 
IN OPEN COURT OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE 
JURY.) 
THE COURT: COUNSEL, HOW EARLY ARE YOU PREPARED 
TO START TOMORROW MORNING? 
MR. YOUNGBERG: I HAVE A PLEA TOMORROW MORNING 
WITH JUDGE WILKINSON. 
THE COURT: I THINK WE BETTER START NO LATER 
THEN 8:30. LET'S DO THAT AND GET THE JURY GOING AGAIN AS 
EARLY AS WE CAN TO GET BACK SOME OF THE TIME WE LOST 
TODAY. 
I'M WONDERING IF IT WOULDN'T BE A GOOD IDEA TO 
ALLOW HIM— ON YOUR APPLICATION TO THE COURT FOR A RECORD 
ON THE DECISION EARLIER, YOU HAVE TWO OPPORTUNITIES TO 
WIN. CLEARLY, WHAT YOU'RE ASKING FOR IS A MOTION IN 
LIMINE, IF I UNDERSTAND IT. 
MR. ANDERSON: YES. 
THE COURT: WHAT I WOULD BE INCLINED TO DO, 
MAKING A RECORD BASED ON THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
WHICH PROHIBITS SUCH A MOTION TO BE MADE THAT'S NOT IN 
WRITING, THAT HAS NOT GIVEN THE COURT PROPER NOTICE. I 
THINK THE RULE IS RULE 12(B)(2), BUT LET ME BE SURE ABOUT 
THAT. 
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1 THAT IS CORRECT. 
2 IT SEEMS TO ME THAT YOU CERTAINLY RETAIN THE 
3 RIGHT TO MAKE AN OBJECTION TO ANY EVIDENCE THAT YOU THINK 
4 IS INAPPROPRIATE, AND WHAT I WOULD DO, TO AVOID 
5 BELABORING THE RECORD BEFORE THE JURY, IF THERE'S A 
6 MATTER THAT COMES UP THAT YOU DISAGREE WITH, THEN I THINK 
7 YOU SHOULD MAKE YOUR OBJECTION, AND YOU CAN APPROACH THE 
8 BENCH AND THEN WE CAN LOOK AT IT AND SEE. IF THIS IS ONE 
9 OF THOSE AREAS THAT NEED TO BE GIVEN A FURTHER LOOK, THEN 
10 I WILL ALLOW YOU TO PUT YOUR OBJECTION ON THE RECORD OUT 
11 OF THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY AND GIVE YOU A CHANCE TO GIVE 
12 SOME ARGUMENT. AND THAT WILL GIVE YOU A CHANCE TO MAKE 
13 YOUR RECORD, AS I THINK IS APPROPRIATE TO THE EVIDENCE AS 
14 PRESENTED, AS TO THE MOTION THAT WASN'T FILED, AS THE 
15 RULE WOULD PROVIDE. 
16 IS THERE ANY PROBLEM WITH THAT? 
17 MR. ANDERSON: THAT'S ACCEPTABLE. 
18 MR. YOUNGBERG: FINE, JUDGE. 
19 THE COURT: LET'S BRING THE JURY IN. 
20 I MR. ANDERSON: YOUR HONOR, I ASK THAT THE 
21 EXCLUSIONARY RULE BE INVOKED. 
22 THE COURT: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN WHO ARE IN THE 
2 3 COURTROOM, ARE THERE ANY WITNESSES HERE? SEVERAL. 
24 WE'RE GOING TO— IT HAS BEEN REQUESTED BY ONE 
25 OF THE PARTIES, AS IS APPROPRIATE, TO INVOKE THE 
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1 THE CASE EITHER ORALLY OR IN WRITING OR OTHERWISE, AND 
2 NOT TO COMMUNICATE YOURSELF WITH ANYONE ABOUT THE CASE 
3 AND NOT TO BEGIN YOUR DELIBERATIONS. 
4 WE'LL BE IN RECESS UNTIL TOMORROW AT 8:30 IN 
5 THE MORNING, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU THEN. I 
6 ENCOURAGE YOU TO COME IN AT 8:20, AND I WILL ASK THE 
7 BAILIFF TO BRING YOU DOUGHNUTS, SO YOU'LL HAVE SOMETHING 
8 TO LOOK FORWARD TO. 
9 (THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HELD 
10 IN OPEN COURT OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE 
11 JURY.) 
12 THE COURT: LET THE RECORD SHOW THE JURY HAS 
13 LEFT THE COURTROOM. 
14 MR. ANDERSON, WHY DON'T YOU PUT ON THE RECORD 
15 YOUR OBJECTION. 
16 MR. ANDERSON: YOUR HONOR, AT SIDE BAR I 
17 OBJECTED TO THE INTRODUCTION OF STATE'S EXHIBIT NUMBER 8 
18 WHICH DEPICTS A STORAGE FACILITY WITH AN OPEN DOOR, 
19 NUMBER 711; ALSO DEPICTS, HOWEVER, STORAGE FACILITY 
20 NUMBER 710. THERE IS A DATE OF 3/29/95, WHICH IS A 
21 BURGLARY— PICTURE TAKEN FOLLOWING A BURGLARY ON THAT 
22 DATE. AND THE DEFENDANT MR. JENNINGS IS NOT CHARGED WITH 
23 BURGLARY ON THE 29TH. 
24 I ARGUED TO THE COURT AT SIDE-BAR THAT THE 
25 PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OUTWEIGHED THE PROBATIVE VALUE IN 
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1 BRINGING ANOTHER STORAGE FACILITY IN. I HAVE OBJECTED 
2. PREVIOUSLY AND RENEW THE OBJECTION TO ANY EVIDENCE 
3 RELATING TO THE BURGLARY THAT OCCURRED ON THE 29TH OF 
4 MARCH. I THINK THAT ITS PROBATIVE VALUE IS MINIMAL 
5 COMPARED TO THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT TO MR. JENNINGS, 
6 BECAUSE IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING THE STATE EVEN ADMITTED 
7 THAT THERE'S NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY HAVE UNDER THE 
8 CIRCUMSTANTIAL NATURE OF TWO BACK-TO-BACK BURGLARIES— 
9 THE STATE HAS NO EVIDENCE TO CONNECT MR. JENNINGS TO THAT 
10 AND THE INFERENCE TO THE 29TH BURGLARY IS HIGHLY 
11 PREJUDICIAL. 
12 THE COURT: MR. YOUNGBERG, DO YOU JOIN IN THAT 
13 OBJECTION? 
14 MR. YOUNGBERG: I JOIN THE OBJECTION. 
15 THE COURT: MR. BLAYLOCK, DO YOU WANT TO 
16 RESPOND? 
17 MR. BLAYLOCK: YOUR HONOR, THIS WAS VERY 
18 RELEVANT BECAUSE IT ALLOWED THIS WITNESS TO SHOW WHAT WAS 
19 THERE THE NIGHT BEFORE WHEN SHE WAS THERE AT THE STORAGE 
20 FACILITY, THAT LOCKER 711, AND WHAT WAS NOT THERE, IN THE 
21 PICTURE IN THE STORAGE FACILITY IN THE PICTURE FOLLOWING 
22 THAT. SO I SUGGEST THAT IT WAS PROBATIVE AND NOT 
23 PREJUDICIAL. THE COURT HAS RULED THAT IN OVERRULING THE 
24 OBJECTION THAT THE PHOTOGRAPH APPEARED TO THE COURT TO BE 
25 RELEVANT AND TO BE PROBATIVE AND THAT ITS PROBATIVE VALUE 
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FAR OUTWEIGHS ANY PREJUDICIAL EFFECT. 
AND I THINK THAT WAS BORNE OUT BY THE WAY IN 
WHICH THE EVIDENCE WAS UTILIZED BY THE WITNESS TO EXPLAIN 
HER TESTIMONY AND TO INFORM THE JURY. 
THE COURT: WE'LL BE IN RECESS UNTIL TOMORROW 
AT 8:30. 
COUNSEL, I WOULD ENCOURAGE YOU— I THINK I'VE 
GOT THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE DEFENDANTS, 
MR. BLAYLOCK. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: I APOLOGIZE TO THE COURT. I 
INTENDED TO USE UP THE LUNCH HOUR TODAY TO FINISH THOSE 
UP. AS OUR TIME WAS SHIFTED CONSIDERABLY I DID NOT HAVE 
THE OPPORTUNITY. I DID NOT EVEN HAVE A CHANCE TO EAT. 
THE COURT: WE DIDN'T TAKE VERY MUCH OF A LUNCH 
HOUR. 
COUNSEL, I SUGGEST THAT YOU GET TOGETHER BEFORE 
WE GO IN SESSION TOMORROW AND SEE IF YOU CAN WORK OUT 
ESSENTIALLY A STIPULATION. DO YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTION— 
IF YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTION, I WANT YOU THEN TO BRING THOSE 
TO THE COURT'S ATTENTION AT NOON TOMORROW AND I HOPE WE 
CAN GET THE JURY OUT TOMORROW SO WE CAN GET THIS 
CONCLUDED BY THEN. AND YOU CAN START WITH THE COURT'S 
STOCK INSTRUCTIONS AS YOUR BASIS. 
MR. YOUNGBERG: JUDGE, FOR THE RECORD, I JUST 
SUBMITTED TWO OR THREE THAT I WANTED IN ADDITION TO YOUR 
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NOTHING MORE THAN THE FACT THAT THERE WAS A DISTURBANCE. 
AND I BELIEVE ON THAT BASIS, THAT FROM THIS, THE JURY 
COULD INFER THAT THERE HAD BEEN ENTRY INTO THE OTHERS. 
AND I THINK THAT THE— THEREFORE THE STATE HAS MET AT 
LEAST THE BURDEN OF SUBMITTING IT TO THE JURY, AND SO THE 
COURT IS WILLING TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE EVIDENCE IS VERY 
THIN, AND MAY RECONSIDER THE ISSUE ON POST TRIAL MOTIONS; 
BUT AT THIS POINT I'M SATISFIED THE STATE MET ITS BURDEN 
AND WILL SUBMIT IT TO THE JURY, AND I'M GOING TO DENY THE 
MOTION. 
ANYTHING ELSE? 
MR. YOUNGBERG: I DON'T BELIEVE SO, JUDGE. 
AT SOME POINT WE STILL HAVE TO PUT ON THE 
RECORD THE OBJECTION TO THE 29TH TESTIMONY, BUT IF YOU 
WANT TO PUSH AHEAD, I SUPPOSE WE CAN START CALLING OUR 
WITNESSES. 
THE COURT: I THINK WHAT I WANT TO DO IS I WANT 
TO GET THIS CASE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AS SOON AS WE CAN 
DO IT. AND AS SOON AS THAT'S DONE I WOULD INVITE COUNSEL 
TO PUT EVERYTHING ON THE RECORD. 
MR. YOUNGBERG: ALL RIGHT. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: JUDGE, SO THAT THERE ISN'T ANY 
QUESTION ABOUT THAT ON BEHALF OF THE STATE, WE WOULD 
STIPULATE THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN EARLIER IN THE TRIAL 
AND IT'S ONLY BECAUSE OF THE PRESS OF GETTING THIS THING 
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BEFORE 
GIVING 
RECORD. 
THE JURY IN A TIMELY FASHION, AND SO THEY ARE NOT 
UP ANYTHING BY DELAYING PUTTING THAT ON 
SO THAT'S CLEARLY STATED SO THERE ISN 
QUESTION ABOUT WAIVER. 
THE 
'T ANY 
THE COURT: THE COURT WOULD RECOGNIZE IT IN THE 
SAME FASHION. 
IN 
PRESENT 
PRESENT 
NOW, LET'S GET THE JURY BACK IN. 
(THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE 
OPEN COURT IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY 
THE COURT: THE RECORD MAY SHOW THE . 
HELD 
•) 
JURY IS 
IN THE COURTROOM, COUNSEL AND THE PARTIES ARE 
• 
MR. YOUNGBERG: JUDGE, FOR OUR FIRST 
WOULD LIKE TO CALL MICHELLE BRANDI SPRAGUE. 
MICHELLE BRANDI SPRAGUE 
WITNESS WE 
CALLED AS A WITNESS IN BEHALF OF THE 
DEFENDANTS, HAVING FIRST BEEN DULY SWORN, 
EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED UPON HER OATH AS 
FOLLOWS: 
BY 
Q. 
JURY. 
A. 
Q. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
MR. YOUNGBERG: 
WOULD YOU PLEASE INTRODUCE YOURSELF < 
MY NAME IS BRANDI SPRAGUE. 
AND HOW LONG HAVE YOU KNOWN JEFFERY . 
WAS 
ro THE 
SPRAGUE? 
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1 IMPORTANT THAT COUNSEL BE PRESENT AND WE WILL DISCUSS 
2 WHAT RESPONSE IS APPROPRIATE. 
3 MR. ANDERSON: I HAVE ONE BRIEF MOTION BEFORE 
4 WE ADJOURN. I'LL MAKE THIS VERY BRIEF. 
5 I WOULD MOVE THAT, AS RELATED TO MR. JENNINGS, 
6 AS THE RESULT OF SOME COMMENTS IN THE FINAL ARGUMENT OF 
7 MR. BLAYLOCK MOVE FOR A MISTRIAL, AND SPECIFICALLY WHEN 
8 HE READ INSTRUCTION NUMBER 17, REFERRING TO THE MENTAL 
9 STATE REQUIRED THAT A PERSON DIRECTLY COMMITS THE 
10 OFFENSE, SOLICITS, REQUESTS, ENCOURAGES, AND THEN 
11 IMMEDIATELY AFTER READING THAT INSTRUCTION HE GAVE A 
12 HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO HOW MR. JENNINGS WENT AND BABY-SAT 
13 SO THE COUPLE COULD GO OUT AND BURGLARIZE AND THEN CAME 
14 BACK AND PICKED HIM UP. I THINK THAT CAN PLACE IN THE 
15 JURY'S MIND AN ARGUMENT THAT WOULD ALLOW THEM TO CONVICT 
16 MR. JENNINGS ON LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT GROUNDS. 
17 THE COURT: MR. BLAYLOCK? 
18 MR. BLAYLOCK: YOUR HONOR, I THINK IT'S A FAIR 
19 COMMENT IN MY ARGUMENT. COUNSEL STATED THAT THESE ARE 
20 VERY CLOSE FRIENDS, AND I THINK IT'S AN ISSUE THE JURY 
21 CAN CONSIDER. HOW MUCH KNOWLEDGE HE HAD, WHETHER OR NOT 
22 BE HAD KNOWLEDGE IN SPITE OF THE THINGS THAT BE TOLD US. 
23 THE COURT: I'M GOING TO DENY THE MOTION, AND 
24 WE WILL SEE WHAT HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE JURY, AND DENY 
25 THE MISTRIAL. 
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1 MY BASIS OF THAT IS IT WAS A FAIR COMMENT, AND 
2 I DO NOT BELIEVE IT WAS SUCH A COMMENT THAT WOULD CAUSE 
3 PREJUDICE TO THE JURY AND RESULT IN AN IMPROPER SORT OF— 
4 MR. BLAYLOCK: YOUR HONOR, COUNSEL STILL HAS 
5 NOT TAKEN THEIR EXCEPTIONS TO THE COURT'S RULING WITH 
6 REGARD TO THE 29TH, THE EVENTS OF THE 29TH. 
7 THE COURT: THAT IS CORRECT. 
8 THE COURT: WHY DON'T W E — 
9 MR. YOUNGBERG: BRIEFLY, JUDGE— 
10 THE COURT: JUST A MINUTE. THIS IS SOMETHING 
11 WE'LL HAVE TO DO TONIGHT. LET'S ALLOW WHATEVER BREAK THE 
12 REPORTER NEEDS AND THEN BE AS QUICK AS WE CAN 
13 (RECESS TAKEN.) 
14 MR. YOUNGBERG: OKAY. I WANT PLACED ON THE 
15 RECORD OUR OBJECTION TO ALLOWING THE PROSECUTOR TO ELICIT 
16 TESTIMONY ABOUT THE BURGLARY THAT TOOK PLACE THE NIGHT 
17 BEFORE THE CHARGED BURGLARY. I WOULD MAKE THAT MOTION ON 
18 A STATE VERSUS COX, DEALING WITH BAD ACTS, PRIOR BAD ACTS 
19 BY DEFENDANTS. IN IN THAT CASE THEY ALSO CITED, 
20 FETHESTON, THAT'S A UTAH CASE, 781, 426. 
21 THEY STATE THAT ALTHOUGH— LET ME JUST— THAT 
22 PRIOR BAD-ACT EVIDENCE NEEDS TO ESTABLISH A MATERIAL 
23 ELEMENT OF THE CRIME THAT'S ACTUALLY CHARGED. AND 
24 THEREFORE BE DIRECTLY PROBATIVE OF A DISPUTED ISSUE 
25 BEFORE IT COULD BE ADMISSIBLE DUE TO ITS INHERENTLY 
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PREJUDICIAL NATURE. AND I SUBMIT IT ON THAT BASIS, 
JUDGE. 
THE COURT: MR. ANDERSON? 
MR. ANDERSON: YOUR HONOR, I ARGUE THIS WAS 
INADMISSIBLE,. I ARGUE IT WAS OVERLY PREJUDICIAL FOR 
MR. JENNINGS, IN FACT THAT THERE WAS NOTHING CONNECTING 
HIM WITH THE NIGHT BEFORE AND HIS RELATIONSHIP TO THE 
MARCH 30TH WAS IN ESSENSE ONE STEP REMOVED EVEN FROM 
MR. SPRAGUE, AND IT WOULD FORCE TO US TRY TO PUT ON ALIBI 
TESTIMONY AND DEFEND TWO CASES AT THE SAME TIME, WHICH IN 
FACT WE DID ATTEMPT TO DO. 
THE COURT: MR. BLAYLOCK, YOUR RESPONSE? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: JUST ONE COMMENT THAT AS THIS 
DEVELOPED I PROVIDED COUNSEL BOTH FOR MR. JENNINGS AND 
MR. SPRAGUE TO PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT THEY FOR SOME REASON 
OR ANOTHER COULD NOT HAVE BEEN THERE OR COMMITTED THAT 
CRIME EITHER BECAUSE THE BOLT CUTTERS WERE NOT AVAILABLE 
THE NIGHT BEFORE OR BECAUSE MR. JENNINGS WAS ASLEEP AT 
HOME IN HIS MOTHER'S HOUSE. SO ACTUALLY I PROVIDED THEM 
SOME FURTHER DEFENSE THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE PREVIOUSLY. 
MR. ANDERSON: YOUR HONOR, I OBJECT TO THE 
CHARACTERIZATION THAT THE STATE WAS DOING US, SOMEHOW, A 
FAVOR BY BRINGING IN THE PRIOR BURGLARY TO EVEN ALLOW 
MORE MATERIAL FOR ALIBI. I DON'T THINK THAT'S AN 
APPROPRIATE RESPONSE AND I DON'T THINK THAT'S WHAT 
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1 MR. BLAYLOCK ARGUED PREVIOUSLY. 
2 THE COURT: WELL, I'M GOING TO RULE NOW. I 
3 HAVE ALREADY RULED, BUT I'M GOING TO SAY ON THE RECORD, 
4 FIRST OF ALL I DON'T THINK WE'RE TALKING ABOUT PRIOR BAD 
5 ACTS BECAUSE THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT I CAN THINK— IT 
6 WAS A COMPLETE DENIAL THAT THE DEFENDANTS HAD ANYTHING TO 
7 DO WITH THE ACTIVITIES OF THE 29TH. 
8 THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE PATTERN OF THOSE 
9 ACTIVITIES SEEM TO ME TO BE RELEVANT IN ALLOWING A FULL 
10 DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE, AND TO EXCLUDE THAT WOULD BE TO 
11 ELIMINATE THAT OPPORTUNITY. IN ADDITION TO THAT, IT 
12 WOULD SEEM TO ME THAT THERE WAS A RELATIONSHIP THAT COULD 
13 BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE EARLIER ACTIVITY AND THE 
14 PRESENT ACTIVITY THAT HAD SOME PROBATIVE SIGNIFICANCE TO 
15 THE ALLEGED ACTIVITIES OF DEFENDANTS ON THE 30TH. 
16 AND FINALLY, IN LOOKING AT THE WAY IN WHICH THE 
17 EFFECT OF THAT EVIDENCE WAS EITHER PREJUDICIAL AS AGAINST 
18 PROBATIVE, I'M CERTAIN THAT MR. BLAYLOCK DIDN'T DO IT 
19 INTENTIONALLY, BUT MY OWN READING OF THE EVIDENCE WAS 
2 0 THAT IT PROBABLY HELPED THE DEFENDANTS MORE THAN IT HURT 
21 THEM, SIMPLY BECAUSE THE CREDIBILITY OF THEIR ACTIVITIES 
22 THE NIGHT BEFORE, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO 
2 3 MR. JENNINGS, WOULD HAVE MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO 
24 BELIEVE THAT HE HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE ACTIVITIES OF 
25 THE NIGHT AFTER THAT. 
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I THINK THAT'S WHAT MR. BLAYLOCK, I THINK, IS 
SAYING. I DON'T THINK HE SAID HE DID IT INTENTIONALLY, 
BUT THAT'S KIND OF HOW THAT CAME OUT. SO I DON'T THINK 
THERE'S A PREJUDICE AS A RESULT. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: I WASN'T SAYING THAT. I DID 
THAT INTENTIONALLY. I STATED THAT AS THE EVIDENCE WAS 
DEVELOPED, IT PROVIDED THEM MORE DEFENSES. 
THE COURT: I BELIEVE THE RECORD HAS BEEN MADE. 
YOU PRESERVED YOUR OBJECTION. 
I THINK WE SHOULD ALLOW— THE COURT WOULD NOTE 
THAT IT'S BEEN A LONG NIGHT AND WE HAVE HAD SEVERAL LONG 
NIGHTS FOR THE LAST SEVERAL WEEKS AND IT HAS BEEN A 
BURDON ON EVERYBODY. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: LET ME JUST SAY PERSONALLY I THINK 
COUNSEL HAVE COMPORTED THEMSELVES WITH PROFESSIONALISM 
AND THAT'S SOMETHING THAT IS HELD VERY HIGHLY IN THE 
COURT'S MIND. I APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT THIS CASE YOU 
DID, YOU FOUGHT HARD AND YOU DISPLAYED YOUR ZEALOUS 
INTEREST IN YOUR CLIENTS. AND YOU DID IT IN A WAY THAT I 
THOUGHT YOU DID YOURSELVES PROUD. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: THANK YOU. 
MR. YOUNGBERG: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. ANDERSON: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
(EVENING RECESS.) 
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MR. BLAYLOCK ARGUED PREVIOUSLY. 
THE COURT: WELL, I'M GOING TO RULE NOW. I 
HAVE ALREADY RULED, BUT I'M GOING TO SAY ON THE RECORD, 
FIRST OF ALL I DON'T THINK WE'RE TALKING ABOUT PRIOR BAD 
ACTS BECAUSE THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT I CAN THINK— IT 
WAS A COMPLETE DENIAL THAT THE DEFENDANTS HAD ANYTHING TO 
DO WITH THE ACTIVITIES OF THE 29TH. 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE PATTERN OF THOSE 
ACTIVITIES SEEM TO ME TO BE RELEVANT IN ALLOWING A FULL 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE, AND TO EXCLUDE THAT WOULD BE TO 
ELIMINATE THAT OPPORTUNITY. IN ADDITION TO THAT, IT 
WOULD SEEM TO ME THAT THERE WAS A RELATIONSHIP THAT COULD 
BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE EARLIER ACTIVITY AND THE 
PRESENT ACTIVITY THAT HAD SOME PROBATIVE SIGNIFICANCE TO 
THE ALLEGED ACTIVITIES OF DEFENDANTS ON THE 30TH. 
AND FINALLY, IN LOOKING AT THE WAY IN WHICH THE 
EFFECT OF THAT EVIDENCE WAS EITHER PREJUDICIAL AS AGAINST 
PROBATIVE, I'M CERTAIN THAT MR. BLAYLOCK DIDN'T DO IT 
INTENTIONALLY, BUT MY OWN READING OF THE EVIDENCE WAS 
THAT IT PROBABLY HELPED THE DEFENDANTS MORE THAN IT HURT 
THEM, SIMPLY BECAUSE THE CREDIBILITY OF THEIR ACTIVITIES 
THE NIGHT BEFORE, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO 
MR. JENNINGS, WOULD HAVE MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO 
BELIEVE THAT HE HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE ACTIVITIES OF 
THE NIGHT AFTER THAT. 
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I THINK THAT'S WHAT MR. BLAYLOCK, I THINK, IS 
SAYING. I DON'T THINK HE SAID HE DID IT INTENTIONALLY, 
BUT THAT'S KIND OF HOW THAT CAME OUT. SO I DON'T THINK 
THERE'S A PREJUDICE AS A RESULT. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: I WASN'T SAYING THAT. I DID 
THAT INTENTIONALLY. I STATED THAT AS THE EVIDENCE WAS 
DEVELOPED, IT PROVIDED THEM MORE DEFENSES. 
THE COURT: I BELIEVE THE RECORD HAS BEEN MADE. 
YOU PRESERVED YOUR OBJECTION. 
I THINK WE SHOULD ALLOW— THE COURT WOULD NOTE 
THAT IT'S BEEN A LONG NIGHT AND WE HAVE HAD SEVERAL LONG 
NIGHTS FOR THE LAST SEVERAL WEEKS AND IT HAS BEEN A 
BURDON ON EVERYBODY. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: LET ME JUST SAY PERSONALLY I THINK 
COUNSEL HAVE COMPORTED THEMSELVES WITH PROFESSIONALISM 
AND THAT'S SOMETHING THAT IS HELD VERY HIGHLY IN THE 
COURT'S MIND. I APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT THIS CASE YOU 
DID, YOU FOUGHT HARD AND YOU DISPLAYED YOUR ZEALOUS 
INTEREST IN YOUR CLIENTS. AND YOU DID IT IN A WAY THAT I 
THOUGHT YOU DID YOURSELVES PROUD. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: THANK YOU. 
MR. YOUNGBERG: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. ANDERSON: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
(EVENING RECESS.) 
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OR DO ANYTHING WITH REGARDS TO HIS PARTICULAR UNIT. 
AND CINDY LOU BEARD, CINDY WAS QUITE UPSET AND 
SHE CONVEYED THAT TO YOU. UNIT 711. TBEY WERE THERE THE 
NIGHT BEFORE, PUT A NEW LOCK ON. SHE COMES BACK THE NEXT 
NIGHT AND THESE HEIRLOOMS, THIS CRIB THAT WAS HANDMADE 
WAS GONE. AND SHE SAID SHE CERTAINLY DIDN'T GIVE ANYONE 
PERMISSION TO BE THERE AND CUT THE LOCK OFF AND TAKE 
THOSE THINGS OUT OF THE THERE. SHE FELT— SHE WAS VERY 
ANGRY ABOUT IT. THE FIRST NIGHT SHE WAS UPSET AND THE 
NEXT NIGHT SHE WAS VERY ANGRY. 
POSSESSION OF INSTRUMENT FOR BURGLARY, THEFT, 
ARE STATE'S EXHIBIT NUMBER 10, STATE'S EXHIBIT NUMBER 15, 
THESE BOLT CUTTERS, THAT NIGHT. HERE'S A PICTURE OF 
WHERE THEY WERE IN THE JEEP. 
AND WHAT WERE THOSE USED FOR? WELL, YOU HEARD 
THE TESTIMONY FROM BOB BRINKMAN. HE SAID THAT STATE'S 
EXHIBIT 7, IF I CAN FIND THAT. EXCUSE ME. HERE IT IS. 
STATE'S EXHIBIT 7 WAS RECEIVED BY HIM IN THE LABORATORY 
AND HE TESTED THAT. AND THE WAY HE SAID HE TESTED THAT 
WAS THAT BE USED LEAD SO THAT IT WOULD GIVE A NICE CLEAN 
CUT, WOULDN'T CHANGE THE TYPE OF EDGE THAT THE BOLT 
CUTTERS HAVE HERE. AND HE SAID HE ACTUALLY PUT A MARK ON 
THERE, AN ARROW, THAT SHOWED TBE AREA BE TESTED, AND WHAT 
DID HE COME UP WITH? EXHIBIT NUMBER 34, PERFECT MATCH. 
HE SAID, THAT'S KIND OF UNUSUAL, IF THERE ARE A 
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